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THE APPEARANCE OF FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: A
CONFLICT IN VALUES
The Washington Supreme Court created the appearance of fairness
doctrine to maintain public confidence in the decisionmaking process of
appointed and elected officials who decide the legal rights and privileges of
parties after a public hearing. I While the doctrine has its roots in common
law concepts of fundamental fairness, 2 application of the doctrine raises a
conflict between two values: accountability and independence. Account-
ability, a value inherent in representative democracy, requires that public
officials interact with constituents. Independence, a value basic to funda-
mental fairness, demands that decisionmakers be isolated from the parties
involved and the public to assure an impartial decision. Because of this
conflict, application of the appearance of fairness doctrine has caused
frustration and confusion. 3 Consequently, the doctrine has been modified
by legislative action.4 In addition, several supreme court dissenting and
concurring opinions have suggested abandoning the doctrine and replacing
it with the Washington State Code of Judicial Conduct and due process. 5
This Comment compares the appearance of fairness doctrine with the
Washington State Code of Judicial Conduct and shows that abandoning the
doctrine and substituting the Code and due process would not resolve the
conflict between independence and accountability, but would further exac-
erbate it. Rather, the appearance of fairness doctrine, modified by the 1982
1. See Washington Medical Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 99 Wn. 2d 466,478,663 P.2d 457,464
(1983); Harris v. Hornbaker, 98 Wn. 2d 650, 658, P.2d 1219, 1222 (1983).
2. The first case in which the Washington court held a quasi-judicial decisionmaker to the
appearance of fairness standard was State ex rel. Barnard v. Board of Educ., 19 Wash. 8, 17-18, 52 P.
317, 320-21 (1898), referring to the requirement that a proceeding appear to be fair:
The principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the judge is as old as
the history of courts. . . . Caesar demanded that his wife should not only be virtuous, but beyond
suspicion; and the state should not be any less exacting with its judicial officers, in whose keeping
are placed not only the financial interests, but the honor, the liberty and the lives of its citizens
3. See Alkire, Washington's Super-Zoning Commission, 14 GoNz. L. REv. 559 (1979) (the
Washington Supreme Court has mischaracterized zoning decisions as quasi-judicial when they are
legislative decisions to which the appearance of fairness doctrine should not apply); Vache,Appearance
of Fairness: Doctrine or Delusion?, 13 WiL.armr L.J. 479 (1977) (while the holdings in the
appearance of fairness cases seem to be based on constitutional due process, the dicta make the doctrine
too broad and undefined, resulting in a doctrine that is unpredictable and unfair).
4. WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 42.36.010-.900 (1985).
5. See Zehring v. City of Bellevue (Zehring I), 99 Wn. 2d 488, 499-501, 663 P.2d 823, 829-30
(1983) (Utter, Stafford, Dolliver, Dimmick, JJ., dissenting), vacated, Zehring v. City of Bellevue
(Zehringll), 103 Wn. 2d588,694 P.2d 638 (1985); WashingtonMedicalDisciplinaryBd., 99Wn. 2d at
483-85,663 P.2d at466-67 (Utter, Dolliver, Dimmick, JJ., concurring);Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at664-68,
658 P.2d at 1228-30 (Utter, Dolliver, Dimmick, JJ., concurring); Westside Hilltop Survival Comm. v.
King County, 96 Wn. 2d 171, 181-82, 634 P.2d 862, 867-68 (1981) (Dolliver, J., concurring).
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appearance of fairness statute, is a standard that accommodates the conflict
inherent in any bias standard applied to elected and appointed officials. The
legislative modifications, however, fall short of the need for a clearly
defined doctrine that provides guidance and certainty for the decision-
makers and the courts. Further modification of the doctrine is needed.
Therefore, this Comment proposes modification of the doctrine that in-
cludes a careful definition of the doctrine, identification of the proceedings
to which it applies, and the inclusion of staff members among those held to
a bias standard and ex parte rules when they participate in those proceed-
ings.
I. THE APPEARANCE OF FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
A. Components of the Appearance of Fairness Doctrine
The appearance of fairness doctrine requires that hearings and decisions
appear to be fair as well as being fair in fact. 6 The Washington courts apply
the doctrine only to "quasi-judicial decisionmakers" acting in "quasi-
judicial proceedings" 7 but not to legislative, 8 ministerial administrative, 9
or judicial procedures. 10 The terms "quasi-judicial decisionmaker" and
"quasi-judicial proceeding" have not been clearly defined by the Washing-
ton courts. The lack of a clear definition of these terms causes much of the
confusion and uncertainty about the doctrine. Decisionmakers and courts
remain uncertain as to when the doctrine applies and to whom it applies.
6. See Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 87
Wn. 2d 802, 808-09, 557 P.2d 303, 312 (1976); Anderson v. Island County, 81 Wn. 2d 312, 326, 501
P.2d 594, 602 (1972); Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wn. 2d 715, 739, 453 P.2d 832, 846 (1969).
7. See Zehring 1, 99 Wn. 2d 488, 496, 663 P.2d 823, 827 (1983), vacated, Zehring 1!, 103 Wn. 2d
588,590,694 P.2d 638,639 (1985); Washington Medical Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 99 Wn. 2d 466.
478, 663 P.2d 457,464 (1983); Harris v. Hornbaker, 98 Wn. 2d 650,660, 658 P.2d 1219, 1223 (1983):
Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wn. 2d 59, 67, 578 P.2d 1309, 1314 (1978); Dorsten v. Port of
Skagit County, 32 Wn. App. 785, 792, 650 P.2d 220, 224 (1982).
8. The United States Supreme Court explained that in legislative decisions there is no right to a
public hearing because such a requirement would be impracticable and because injured parties find
redress for unfair treatment at the polls:
The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the
whole. General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of
individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights
are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or
remote, over those who make the rule.
Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization. 239 U.S. 441,445 (1915).
9. Ministerial administrative action is usually performed by employees of the executive branch of
government and, while it can be an action that confers or denies legal rights, it is a nondiscretionary
action. See Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 73, 510 P.2d
1140, 1149, rev. denied, 83 Wn. 2d 1002 (1973).
10. Judicial procedures are reviewed under the WASHINGTON STATE CODE OF JUDICIAl. CONDUCT,




A quasi-judicial decisionmaker is generally a legislator, not a judge."
He or she is elected to represent local constituents or is an official appointed
by a local legislator. The quasi-judicial decisionmaker sits on a tribunal
with peers, deciding the legal rights and privileges of parties under a statute
or ordinance. Members of the boards of county commissioners, city
councils, and planning commissions are examples of quasi-judicial deci-
sionmakers. 12 More important to the question of the appearance of fairness
doctrine, however, is the determination of whether a decisionmaker is, in
fact, presiding over a quasi-judicial proceeding. If so, the decisionmaker is
quasi-judicial.
2. Quasi-Judicial Proceeding
a. The Problem: Vague and Inconsistent Language
The Washington Supreme Court's latest appearance of fairness decision,
Zehring v. City of Bellevue, (Zehring II), 13 demonstrates the way in which
unclear language in appearance of fairness cases causes uncertainty and
confusion. The first time the court reviewed the case, in Zehring v. City of
Bellevue (Zehring 1), 14 it held that a design review hearing, which was
required by the Bellevue City Council as a condition of granting a rezone,
was a quasi-judicial proceeding to which the appearance of fairness doc-
trine applied. 15 The court held that the three factors indicative of a quasi-
judicial action were present in this case: (1) the issue involved identifiable
parties; (2) the decision would have a greater impact on those parties than
on the public in general; and (3) a public hearing was statutorily required. 16
The court reasoned that even though public hearings were not statutorily
required for a design review, they were required for zoning reclassifica-
tions; 17 the court labelled the design review a zoning reclassification
11. The term "quasi-judicial decisionmaker" excludes judges because the word "quasi" means
"as if" or "analogous to." See BLAcK's LAW DIcIONARY, 5th Ed. 1120 (1979). Since judges arejudicial
decisionmakers, they cannot be as if or analogous to judicial decisionmakers, i.e., they cannotbe quasi-
judicial decisionmakers.
12. This generalization follows from a survey of the cases. See, e.g., Harris v. Hornbaker, 98 Wn.
2d 650, 658 P.2d 1219 (1983) (county commissioners); Westside Hilltop Survival Comm. v. King
County, 96 Wn. 2d 171, 634 P.2d 862 (1981) (county council); Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wn. 2d
454,573 P.2d 359 (1978) (city council); Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wn. 2d
416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974) (planning commission).
13. 103 Wn. 2d 588, 694 P.2d 638 (1985).
14. 99 Wn. 2d 495, 663 P.2d 823 (1983), vacated, (Zehring 11), 103 Wn. 2d 588, 694 P.2d 638
(1985).
15. 99 Wn. 2d at 497, 663 P.2d at 828.
16. Id. at 496, 663 P.2d at 828.
17. Id. at 497, 663 P.2d at 828.
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because it was an extension of the rezone action. The City Council granted
the rezone on condition that the applicant's plan pass the design review. 18
On reconsideration, in Zehring H, 19 the Washington court reversed its
decision. The court held the previous characterization of the design review
hearing to be erroneous. 20 The design review hearing was now labelled an
"administrative function," 21 to which the doctrine did not apply. It was not
an extension of the rezone after all because the rezone ordinance had
already been passed and the planning commission could not authorize
activity on the property not already granted in the rezone. 22 The planning
commission could grant the individual applicant no new rights. The court
stated that the legal rights of the parties were determined in the rezone
decision, which was final with the passage of the ordinance prior to the
design review hearing. 23 The court then noted that the appearance of
fairness doctrine has never been applied to "administrative actions" unless
the hearing was statutorily required; the Bellevue City Code did not require
hearings for design review. 24 The Zehring II court ignored two of the three
factors held determinative in Zehring I: (1) that the issues involved identi-
fiable parties and (2) that the decision would have a greater impact on those
parties than on the public in general.2 5 The court appears to have replaced
those factors with the requirement that the decision authorize something
more than a previous decision on the same subject. 26
The Zehring II definition of a proceeding to which the appearance of
fairness doctrine applies appears to include: (1) a requirement that the
decision determine the legal rights of the parties; (2) that the decision grant
legal rights not previously granted; 27 and (3) the hearing be statutorily
required if the action is classified as administrative.
The difficulties posed by the definition are numerous. The court failed to
explain what determining the legal rights of the parties includes and why
the design review board's power to effectively abrogate the legal rights of
18. Id. at 496, 663 P.2d at 828.
19. 103 Wn. 2d 588, 694 P.2d 638 (1985).
20. Id. at 590, 694 P.2d at 639.
21. Id. at 591, 694 P.2d at 639. The Zehring II court characterized the design review hearing as an
"administrative function" and cited Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wn. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309
(1978), for the proposition that the doctrine is never applied to such actions unless a hearing is
statutorily required. The issue in Polygon was the denial of a building permit. No hearing was
conducted. The Polygon definition of "administrative" seems to be any action of municipal employees
that does not require a public hearing. Polygon, 90 Wn. 2d at 67-68, 578 P.2d at 1314.
22. 103 Wn. 2d at 591, 694 P.2d at 639.
23. Id. at 590, 694 P.2d at 639.
24. Id. at 591, 694 P.2d at 639.
25. 99 Wn. 2d at 497, 663 P.2d at 828.




the parties was not included.2 8 It failed to confirm whether two of the three
requirements set forth in Zehring 1,29 that parties must be identifiable and
the decision must impact the parties more than the general public, still per-
tain. The Zehring II court seemed to add a new requirement that unless the
determination was a grant of new legal rights, it would not be considered a
sufficient determination to invoke the doctrine. 30 The opinion does not
define "administrative action." Nor does the opinion indicate whether the
hearing must be statutorily required if the action is not "administrative."
28. The rezone was granted conditioned on an agreement that required approval of the design by
the planning commission. The agreement stipulated that the two-story building that the owners wanted
to construct could be built if the planning commission found in the design review that the building
would not visually intrude on neighboring properties. -If the design was found visually intrusive, the
planning commission could recommend the two story building could not be built and the city could
revoke the rezone. 103 Wn. 2d at 590, 694 P.2d at 639.
29. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
30. 103 Wn. 2d at 590,591,694 P.2d at 639. The court stated that "The rezone, not design review,
determined the legal rights of the parties. . . .Design review to determine only whether the proposed
buildings will visually intrude upon specified residential areas is not a rezone action. The planning
commission's determination authorized no activity on the property not previously authorized by the
City Council." Id. This language can be read to imply that the planning commission had very limited
discretion in determining if the design was visually intrusive because it had to follow strict standards
laid out in ordinance or regulations. However, the court did not indicate that this was the basis of its
reasoning.
Because of that omission, the Zehring 11 court apparently reached two conclusions. First, the setting
of zoning controls, e.g., granting a rezone, is an adjudicatory function, but the enforcement of zoning
controls, e.g., rezone conditions, is not an adjudicatory function; therefore, enforcement of zoning
controls is not subject to the doctrine. The court took a different position in Durocher v. King County,
80 Wn. 2d 139, 152-53, 492 P.2d 547, 555-56 (1972). Second, a recommending body will not be
subject to the doctrine because the final power to decide rests in another body. This is contrary to the
holding in Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wn. 2d 518, 525,495 P.2d 1358, 1362-63 (1972). If this is the
holding in Zehring II, a large percentage of administrative decisions might be removed from review
under the doctrine because boards and commissions, legislative bodies, and hearings examiners often
enforce ordinances in individual cases in public hearings. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE §§ 35A.63.120,
.170, 36.70.580, .970 (1985).
Such a holding could also result in the doctrine being no longer applicable to decisions made by
recommending bodies. The statute authorizes application of the doctrine to "planning commissions
• . . or boards which determine the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties in a hearing or
other contested case proceeding." WASH. REv. CODE § 42.36.010 (1985); 103 Wn. 2d at 593, 694 P.2d
at 640 (Dore, J., dissenting). Several Washington cases have subjected planning commission proceed-
ings to the doctrine. See, e.g., Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wn. 2d 416,526
P.2d 897 (1974); Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wn. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972); Chrobuck v.
Snohomish County, 78 Wn. 2d 858,480 P.2d 489 (1971); Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wn. 2d 715,453
P.2d 832 (1969). This interpretation would severely narrow the scope of the doctrine.
On the other hand, the facts in Zehring I can lead one to the conclusion that the planning commission
did determine a legal right separate from that granted in the rezone. The planning commission
determined if the owners could build a two-story building. With that reading of the facts, provided the
determination of visual impairment was not based upon specific standards which the commission was
required to invoke, the design review hearing is a quasi-judicial proceeding under the Zehring I
definition. The crucial point may be that the courts or the legislature must clarify the meaning of the
words "determine the legal rights of the parties."
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Decisionmakers need a clearer definition of quasi-judicial proceeding that
will help them determine, in advance, if a hearing will be adjudicatory and
thus subject to the appearance of fairness doctrine.
b. The Historical Definitions
First, quasi-judicial proceedings can be legislative proceedings or ad-
ministrative proceedings, but they will always be adjudicatory proceed-
ings. 31 This in itself has been confusing because the court has used
"administrative" to designate an action or proceeding that does not require
a public hearing, 32 to describe a proceeding in which the legislative body
administers zoning controls, 33 and to characterize a proceeding as nonad-
judicatory.34 Since quasi-judicial proceedings are only adjudicatory pro-
ceedings, the distinction between adjudicatory and nonadjudicatory is the
key distinction, whether the proceeding is legislative or administrative. The
court must adhere to a constant usage of the phrase "administrative" as
well as a constant definition of an "adjudication."
Second, then, among the court's concerns is the definition of ad-
judicatory proceedings. Adjudicatory proceedings can be identified by
three factors: the issues involved, the degree of the decisionmaker's discre-
tion, and statutory mandate. The distinction between adjudicatory and
nonadjudicatory issues is not always clear. The United States Supreme
Court identified the characteristics of this distinction in two related cases in
which the plaintiffs claimed the right to a hearing. The due process right to
a hearing applies only to issues that lead to adjudicatory decisions, not to
legislative decisions that are nonadjudicatory. 35 In Londoner v. City and
County of Denver, 36 the plaintiff challenged an assessment of his property
for street paving improvements on the grounds that he was not afforded an
opportunity to be heard. 37 In Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of
Equalization, 38 a Denver property owner challenged the increase of prop-
erty values for all properties in the City of Denver on the same grounds. 39
31. See Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wn. 2d 292, 298-99, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972).
32. See supra note 21.
33. See Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wn. 2d 847, 850, 557 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1976); Durocher v.
King County, 80 Wn. 2d 139, 152-53, 492 P.2d 547, 555-56 (1972).
34. See Zehring 11, 103 Wn. 2d at 590, 694 P.2d at 639.
35. See supra note 8. Courts and commentators will often use legislative to mean nonadjudicatory
because legislative decisions are based on nonadjudicatory facts, i.e., facts general to the populace, not
specific to individuals. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. Therefore, legislative proceed-
ings can be adjudicatory, but legislative decisions are not.
36. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
37. See id. at 374.
38. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).




The Londoner Court held that a hearing was required, 40 but the Bi-Metallic
Court held that due process did not require a hearing. 41 The Bi-Metallic
Court distinguished the two cases. 42 The Court reasoned that because the
Londoner case involved a relatively small group of owners, exceptionally
affected, each on individual grounds, the issue was adjudicatory. Accord-
ingly, the tax assessment without a hearing was a violation of due pro-
cess. 43 On the other hand, the valuation increase in the City of Denver, at
issue in the Bi-Metallic case, did not turn on factors peculiar to the
individual properties involved, but on more generalized considerations
about the level of taxes needed. Hence, the proceeding did not require the
opportunity for all affected to be heard because such a requirement would
be impracticable. 44 The Londoner/B i-Metallic distinction suggests that the
issue is adjudicatory when the decision exceptionally affects a relatively
small group of people, each on facts specific to the individual in the
proceeding.
Since the function being performed by the decisionmaker determines
whether the appearance of fairness requirement applies, it is essential to
identify the function by characterizing the issues as adjudicatory or nonad-
judicatory. When deciding adjudicatory issues, the decisionmaker is per-
forming an adjudicatory function; when deciding legislative issues, the
decisionmaker is performing a legislative function. This distinction be-
tween adjudicatory and legislative functions is very important because
most quasi-judicial decisionmakers are also legislators who may perform
both legislative and adjudicatory functions in the same proceeding. Under
Londoner/Bi-Metallic, the key to the distinction between the legislative and
adjudicatory function is the basis of the decision being made. In the
legislative function, the final decision turns on facts general to all parties
who may be affected, whether they participated in the proceeding or not.45
The purpose of the legislative function is to make policy or law.46 In an
adjudication, by contrast, the decision is based on the facts specific to the
individuals in the proceeding. 47 The purpose of the adjudicative function is
40. 210 U.S. at 385.
41. 239 U.S. at 445.
42. Id. at 445-46.
43. 210 U.S. at 386.
44. 239 U.S. at 445-46.
45. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., 239 U.S. at 445-46.
46. In Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wn. 2d 292, 299,502 P.2d 327,331 (1972), the Washington
court distinguished between legislative and adjudicatory functions of a legislative body and declared
that legislative functions involve "policy making." See also Dorsten v. Port of Skagit County, 32 Wn.
App. 785, 792, 650 P.2d 220, 224 (1982).
47. See Bi-Metallic nv. Co., 239 U.S. at 445.
In Fleming, the Washington Supreme Court also made the distinction between legislative and
adjudicatory actions. The court defined an adjudication as a proceeding in which the parties are
539
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to resolve the conflict between or among the parties to the proceeding. 48
The line between the adjudicative function and the legislative function,
however, is often hard to recognize. Sometimes policy or law emerges from
an adjudicatory decision, and sometimes legislative decisions affect spe-
cific parties based on facts specific to those parties. For example, in a local
zoning proceeding, adopting a zoning ordinance is a legislative act. The
policy decision turns not so much on facts peculiar to specific parcels of
land as on more general considerations about the community affected. The
proceeding is legislative rather than adjudicatory even though it requires a
public hearing and affects individual landowners. 49 The decision to change
the zoning of a particular piece of land (to rezone), on the other hand, is
adjudicatory. The specific facts of the individual case before the decision-
makers shape the results.
The categories are not free of overlap, and potential for confusion looms
large.50 Often zoning ordinances benefit particular landowners who sup-
ported the ordinance in a public hearing. In addition, a rezone sometimes
reflects or establishes a policy regarding changes in zoning.5' Despite the
identifiable and the impact is felt in a small geographic area. See 81 Wn. 2d at 299, 502 P.2d at 331.
These factors are similar to the LondonerlBi-Metallic definition. The Fleming definition, however, does
not explicitly include the requirement in Bi-Metallic that the identifiable parties be "exceptionally
affected on individual grounds" and that the decision in an adjudication turns on facts specific to the
parties. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., 239 U.S. at 446. The Fleming definition seems to provide a broader
protection. It also, however, adds to the confusion by not addressing the nature of the facts under
consideration since many legislative decisions affect identifiable individuals, but are not decided on
facts specific to the individuals. The tax assessment in Bi-Metallic is a perfect example. Therefore, this
Comment advocates adoption of the more specific LondonerlBi-Metallic formulation. See supra notes
36-44 and accompanying text.
48. See Fleming, 81 Wn. 2d at 299,502 P.2d at 331; see also Cramton, A Comment On Trial-Type
Hearings In Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585, 588 (1972).
49. See 81 Wn. 2d at 299, 502 P.2d at 331.
50. The Washington Supreme Court has added to the inherent confusion surrounding the distinc-
tion between adjudication and nonadjudication. See supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text.
51. The Washington court attempted to deal with the distinction between legislative and ad-
judicative functions in Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wn. 2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976), a case that
challenged the validity of rezoning by means of referendum. The court focused on the temporal aspect
of the issue, and defined legislative acts as those regarding subjects that are permanent and general as
opposed to temporary and specific to special circumstances. Adoption of a zoning code or comprehen-
sive plan is thus legislative, and amending the zoning code (a rezone) is administrative and ad-
judicatory, therefore, "quasi-judicial." Id. at 850-51, 557 P.2d at 1308-09 (citing Fleming, 81 Wn. 2d
at 299, 502 P.2d at 331).
If local government units followed uniform operating procedures, such as those outlined in the
Washington Administrative Procedures Act (APA), the reviewing courts and decisionmakers could
more easily determine which functions are legislative and which are adjudicative. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 34.04.010-.940 (1985). Local governments, however, do not operate under a uniform set of
procedures and are not covered by this legislation. In addition, under the APA's uniform standards the
distinction between rulemaking and adjudication is as unclear and has as much overlap as the distinction
between adjudicative and legislative functions. Note that even if application of the APA solved certain
definitional problems, it might not remove the necessity of developing an appearance of fairness
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overlap in these functions, and the difficulty of distinguishing them at the
outset, the distinction is useful for purposes of determining whether to
apply the doctrine. When a decision exceptionally affects a small group of
people on individual grounds, and when the decision is to be based on a
hearing, those affected should be granted the safeguards of an adjudicatory
proceeding that includes an impartial decisionmaker.
Identifying an adjudicatory issue, however, is only part of the determina-
tion that a proceeding is adjudicatory; agency employees, who are not
quasi-judicial decisionmakers, often perform tasks that affect a small group
of people, exceptionally, on individual grounds. The second element used
to define an adjudicatory proceeding is the amount of discretion of the
decisionmaker. The decisionmaker in an adjudication commands broad
discretion that usually includes fashioning a decision that will serve the
public welfare. A decisionmaker performing a ministerial administrative
function, on the other hand, has very limited discretion. 52 Statutes or
regulations specificially define the discretion that the ministerial admin-
istrative decisionmaker possesses. A fire code inspector, for example, is a
ministerial administrative decisionmaker. The fire code inspector must
issue a citation for violation of the fire code if the inspected premises do not
meet the standards laid out in the relevant ordinance and regulations. The
local legislative body, however, on appeal, in its discretion, may make an
exception or set conditions for approval of the premises. 53
doctrine. A proposed revision of the Washington APA has been developed by a special task force of the
Washington State Bar Association. The introductory comment for the proposal states the goal of
fairness and an appearance of fairness in administrative procedures. See WASHINGTON STATE BAR Ass'N
ADMIN. LAW TASK FORCE, PROPOSED REVISIONS WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACr
(1984). The proposed revision includes a provision for disqualification of a presiding officer "for bias,
prejudice, interest, or any other cause provided in this chapter or for which a judge is disqualified." Id.
Part IV § 39. Since the introductory comment states a goal of appearance of fairness and since judges
can be disqualified for appearance of fairness violations, the APA under the proposal will incorporate an
appearance of fairness requirement for hearings parallel to the appearance of fairness doctrine. Id. at 2
(introductory comment).
52. See supra note 9.
53. In the appeal proceeding, the inspector, representing the government, and the owner will
become adversaries. The inspector may contend that the approval should not be granted while the owner
contends that it should; both sides have the opportunity to be heard before the tribunal, both have notice
of the hearing and an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and the decisionmakers have the
discretion to grant an exception not specifically expressed in the statute or regulations.
The determination that the decisionmaker has sufficient discretion to make an issue adjudicatory or
nonadjudicatory does not necessarily remain static. For example, the Washington Supreme Court noted
that the ministerial administrative act of granting a permit has been changed into a discretionary action
by the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA), WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.010-.914 (1985).
See Polygon Corp., 90 Wn. 2d at 64,578 P.2d at 1312. SEPA mandates that a determination of whethera
proposed project involves major action with significant impact on the environment be made by the
granting agency before a permit may be granted.
The Washington court has not always carefully articulated the nature of the discretion of the
decisionmaker in characterizing a decision as adjudicatory or not. In Zehring II, the court appeared to
Washington Law Review Vol. 61:533, 1986
The Washington Supreme Court has apparently added a third step in
determining whether a proceeding is quasi-judicial. If the issue is ad-
judicatory, the next inquiry is whether a hearing is statutorily required. 54 If
a hearing is required, the doctrine applies. 55 Where a hearing is not
required and the issue is adjudicatory, the Washington court has never
applied the doctrine. 56
The Washington court's discussion of the hearing requirement in
Zehring JJ,57 however, adds some ambiguity to this analysis. In that case,
find no discretion in the ability of the planning commission to recommend that the conditions of the
rezone were not met if the applicant had not met the design review requirements, because if the
commission found a "visual intrusion," it had no choice but to deny the application for the two-story
structure. 103 Wn. 2d 588, 591, 694 P.2d 638, 639 (1985). The dissent, on the other hand, found the
"visual intrusion" standard itself to be a matter of discretion. See 103 Wn. 2d at 591-94, 694 P.2d at
640-41 (1985) (Dore, J., dissenting). A nondiscretionary matter might be enforcement of a regulation
that the structure be 20 ft. from the street. This disagreement can best be handled not by renouncing the
appearance of fairness doctrine, but by carefully examining the decision involved in each case and
identifying its discretionary reach.
54. See Harris v. Hornbaker, 98 Wn. 2d 650, 658 P.2d 1219 (1983). In Harris, the court stated that
a public hearing is necessary before a proceeding is quasi-judicial. Id. at 660, 658 P.2d at 1223. The
Harris court reasoned, however, that the statutory requirement of a hearing was not a sufficient
condition to find that a proceeding was quasi-judicial: "Prior cases should not be interpreted as
indicating that a decision becomes quasi judicial and triggers the appearance of fairness doctrine by the
mere fact that a hearing is required by statute." Id. at 660, 658 P.2d at 1223.
55. The Washington court has avoided stating an outright statutory requirement by including the
existence of a statutorily required hearing with other elements. See Zehring II, 103 Wn. 2d at 591, 694
P 2d at 639 ("The appearance of fairness doctrine has never been applied to administrative action except
where a public hearing was required by statute."); Zehring 1, 99 Wn. 2d at 495, 663 P.2d at 827 (" [A]
rule may be formulated that whenever an administrative body, acting in a legislative or quasi-judicial
capacity, conducts a public hearing, required by law, . . . the appearance of fairness doctrine should
apply."); Fleming, 81 Wn. 2d at 299, 502 P.2d at 331 ("Finally, legislative hearings are generally
discretionary with the body conducting them, whereas zoning hearings are required by statute, charter,
or ordinance. The fact that these hearings are required is itself recognition of the fact that the
decisionmaking process must be more sensitive to the rights of the individual citizen involved."); Smith
v. Skagit County, 75 Wn. 2d 715, 739, 453 P.2d 832, 846 (1969) ("It is axiomatic that, whenever the
law requires a hearing of any sort as a condition precedent to the power to proceed, it means a fair
hearing, a hearing not only fair in substance, but fair in appearance as well.").
56. See Polygon, 90 Wn. 2d at 67-68, 578 P.2d at 1314:
The appearance of fairness doctrine was first applied in Smith v. Skagit County, [citation
omitted] to provide a due-process type standard for statutorily required hearings of a legislative
body acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. It has never been applied to administrative action, except
where a public hearing was required by statute. See Seattle v. Loutsis Inv. Co., 16 Wn. App. 158,
173, 554 P.2d 379 (1976) (emphasis in original).
Thus, where a hearing is statutorily required and is conducted, the doctrine has been applied.
Again, subject to its intended meaning of the word "administrative," the Polygon court seemed to
imply further that if a legislative body was deciding an adjudicatory issue but a hearing was not
required, the doctrine would not apply. In the Polygon case the action challenged was not that of a
legislative body, but an administrative agency: no hearing was required and no hearing was conducted.
No case has arisen, however, where the court has refused to apply the doctrine once it unambiguously
found the proceeding was adjudicatory and a hearing was conducted though not statutorily required.
57. 103 Wn. 2d at 591, 694 P.2d at 639.
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the court stated that "[t]he appearance of fairness doctrine has never been
applied to administrative action except where a public hearing was required
by statute."58 This sentence is subject to two interpretations because of the
ways in which the court uses "administrative." First, the court may have
merely affirmed the Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle59 formulation that only
those adjudicatory proceedings that are administrative, as opposed to
legislative, and that entail a statutorily required hearing are subject to
application of the appearance of fairness doctrine. 60 Second, the court may
have intended that the doctrine apply even to nonadjudicatory admin-
istrative actions, so long as a hearing is statutorily required. If the latter
interpretation is correct, a broad range of proceedings previously exempt
from the doctrine could now be subject to it. Moreover, under this inter-
pretation, the court would have implicitly overruled a line of prior cases
such as Harris v. Hornbaker61 where the court stressed that the central
issue was whether the proceeding was an adjudication, not that a statute
required a hearing.
The goal of the appearance of fairness doctrine is to maintain public
confidence in adjudicatory decisions by nonjudges through procedural
safeguards. 62 To apply the doctrine to all decisions that require a hearing
even though the decisionmaker lacks discretion or even though the issues
were not individual in nature, as the Zehring II opinion can be read to
imply,63 would not meet the goal of the doctrine. Disregarding the con-
fusion in cases such as Zehring 1164 and focusing instead on this purpose,
Washington courts have three options for defining the limits of the appear-
ance of fairness doctrine. First, the courts could apply the appearance of
58. Id.
59. 90 Wn. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
60. See supra note 56.
61. 98 Wn. 2d 650, 659, 658 P.2d 1219, 1223 (1983).
62. InPolygon, 90Wn. 2d at68, 578 P.2d at 1314, the court asserted that the appearance of fairness
doctrine had been developed for hearings. In Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wn. 2d 715, 739, 453 P.2d
832,846 (1969), the court held that whenever a hearing is required, that hearing must appear to be fair as
well as be fair. The doctrine has its roots in the common law due process principle that whenever a
person is subjected to a judicial proceeding, the decisionmaker must be impartial. See supra note 2.
63. 103 Wn. 2d 588, 694 P.2d 638 (1985). Application of the doctrine to administrative proceed-
ings that are nonadjudicatory simply because the hearing is statutorily required would be contrary to
prior case law, and could be incredibly burdensome because it would subject many hearings that are not
now covered to review under the doctrine. See, e.g., Somer v. Woodhouse, 28 Wn. App. 262, 274, 623
P.2d 1164, 1171 (1981) (rulemaking concerning apprentice opticians); Evergreen School Dist. No. 114 v.
Clark County Comm. on School Dist. Org., 27 Wn. App. 826, 832,621 P.2d 770,774 (1980) (decision
to change school district boundaries). State and local agency rulemaking and ratemaking hearings,
school board budget hearings, special district planning hearings, and many more could be swept into
the purview of the doctrine.
64. 103 Wn. 2d 588, 694 P.2d 638 (1985).
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fairness doctrine when the issues are adjudicatory and the decisionmaker
has broad discretion, even if a hearing is not held. Second, the doctrine
could be applied only when the issues are adjudicatory, the decisionmaker
has broad discretion, and a hearing is statutorily required. Third, courts
could apply the doctrine when the issues are adjudicatory, the decision-
maker has broad discretion, and a hearing is conducted, whether or not it is
statutorily required.
Under the first option, since the doctrine requires notice, an opportunity
to be heard, and other elements of a fair hearing in cases where no hearing
was held, the court in retrospect would always find a violation. This is too
broad a reading of the doctrine and would prove burdensome for the
government entities involved. Many adjudicatory decisions are made with-
out hearings because of the great expense a hearing would add. 65 For
example, professional licensing involves an adjudicatory decision. Instead
of holding a separate hearing for every person that wants to practice law in
the state of Washington, an examination is administered, and those partici-
pants scoring above a preset passing grade are then allowed to practice law.
To hold a separate adjudicatory hearing for the more than one thousand
applicants each year would be far too expensive and inefficient. 66
The second option, then, requires an additional element, a statutory
mandate. Such a mandate, however, does not bear on the right to an
impartial decisionmaker. This right may arise under the due process clause
of the state and federal constitutions or the common law, as well as by
statute. The fact that no statute required a hearing that was actually held
should not, therefore, determine the fairness standard for the hearing.67
If a hearing is not statutorily required, but is conducted anyway, the
decisionmaker should be required to be impartial and the hearing required
to be fair under the doctrine. Therefore, the third option suggests the best
course for the courts. When the issues are adjudicatory, the decisionmaker
possesses broad discretion, and a hearing is conducted, the appearance of
fairness doctrine should be applied. 68 Adopting this analysis would end the
65. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
66. For the past few years the Washington State Bar Association has received 1000 to 1200 bar
examination applications each year. Telephone interview with Wayne Wilson, Director of Public
Affairs of the Washington State Bar Association (January 21, 1986) (notes of interview on file with the
Washington Law Review).
67. When an administrative decision is made and no hearing is held or required, a claim that the
decisionmaker is biased will be reviewed by the court with an actual bias standard. Proof of influence
outside the record would be required. See Polygon, 90 Wn. 2d at 68, 578 P.2d at 1314. Note that whether
a hearing should have been held under principles of due process is a separate question. Ifa court finds a
hearing should have been conducted under the fourteenth amendment but was not, it will remand for a
hearing and the doctrine would then apply.
68. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975). For example, in Zehring 11. 103 Wn. 2d 588,
694 P.2d 638 (1985), had the court held that the issue of the proceeding being reviewed was
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confusion about whether and when a hearing is required to apply the
doctrine. Whether the public hearing is statutorily required or not is
irrelevant.
Courts then should make it clear that quasi-judicial proceedings are
those public hearings in which adjudicatory issues are heard and decisions
are made by decisionmakers, who are not judges, with broad discretion.
Such proceedings may involve legislative or administrative decisions to the
same degree, but only if an adjudicatory issue is heard by a decisionmaker
with broad discretion is the proceeding quasi-judicial within the context of
the appearance of fairness doctrine.
3. The Appearance of Fairness Violation
The definition of the elements constituting a violation of the appearance
of fairness standard is perhaps the clearest component of the appearance of
fairness doctrine. If a proceeding is quasi-judicial, the test for whether the
proceeding has an appearance of fairness is whether a reasonably prudent
and disinterested observer would conclude that all parties obtained a fair
and impartial hearing.69 Two aspects of the hearing are examined under this
test: (1) the fairness of the hearing procedures; and (2) the impartiality of the
decisionmakers, also known as the bias standard.70
To satisfy the procedural element of the appearance of fairness standard
regarding hearing procedures, interested parties must be afforded the right
to adequate notice, 71 the right to be heard, 72 the right to cross-examine
witnesses, 73 and the right to have knowledge of all communications with
the decisionmaker. 74 A verbatim record must also be kept.75
adjudicatory, the additional fact that a hearing was conducted should have triggered application of the
doctrine.
69. See Swift v. Island County, 87 Wn. 2d 348, 361,552 P.2d 175, 183 (1976).
70. See Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wn. 2d 292, 299, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972).
71. See Glaspey & Sons v. Les Conrad, 83 Wn. 2d 707, 521 P.2d 1173 (1974).
72. See Hayden v. Port Townsend, 28 Wn. App. 192, 622 P.2d 1291 (1981) (court found a violation
because of direct benefit to the decisionmaker's employer but also found unfair access to decision-
makers because of participation in hearing by chairperson after voluntary disqualification); see also
Anderson v. Island County, 81 Wn. 2d 312, 501 P.2d 594 (1972) (chairperson told opponents at public
hearing they were wasting their time); Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wn. 2d 715,739-42,453 P.2d 832,
846-47 (1969) (opponents were excluded from meeting of decisionmakers with proponents).
73. See Chrobuckv. Snohomish County, 78 Wn. 2d 858, 871,480 P.2d489, 496 (1971) (court held
cross-examination required for an objective factual evaluation where proponents and opponents are
represented by counsel, expert witnesses called, and complex technical data disputed).
74. See Smith, 75 Wn. 2d at 734-41, 453 P.2d at 843-47 (meeting with proponents, excluding
opponents, in private session outside public hearing).
75. See Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wn. 2d 454, 464, 573 P.2d 359, 365 (1978) (verbatim
record required of quasi-judicial proceedings to facilitate judicial review).
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The bias standard forbids prejudgment of the issue. For example, courts
have disqualified quasi-judicial decisionmakers when the decisionmaker
announced the decision before the hearing 76 and when the decisionmaker
told opponents of the proposal before the hearing that they were wasting
their time. 77
The impartiality standard also forbids financial or personal interest in the
outcome of a decision. The Washington court has disqualified decision-
makers who owned land near the property being rezoned, 78 and a decision-
maker who was the mortgagee of the property involved in the proceeding.79
Quasi-judicial decisionmakers have also been disqualified when the deci-
sionmaker was employed by the successful rezone applicant soon after the
hearing,80 when the decisionmaker's employer would directly benefit from
the decision,8' and when the decisionmaker had a pending employment
application with one of the parties to the proceeding. 82 Moreover, Washing-
ton courts have disqualified decisionmakers who were associated with an
organization which publicly supported one of the parties. 83 Probably the
broadest reading of the personal bias standard was applied by the Washing-
ton Court of Appeals in Fleck v. King County,84 when it held that a
proceeding in which spouses voted on the same side of an issue violated the
appearance of fairness doctrine.85
B. Development of the Doctrine: Further Opportunities to Clarify the
Doctrine
As early as 1894, a Washington court held that "trials of causes should
have the appearance of fairness." 86 Interpreting the Washington State Code
of Judicial Conduct and the statute that provides for disqualification of
76. Chrobuck, 78 Wn. 2d at 866-67, 480 P.2d at 494-95.
77. Anderson, 81 Wn. 2d at 326, 501 P.2d at 602.
78. Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wn. 2d 518,525,495 P.2d 1358, 1362 (1972) (chair of planning
commission owned property two lots from the property involved); but see Byers v. Board of Clallam
County Comm'rs, 84 Wn. 2d 796, 529 P.2d 823 (1974) (members of planning commission owned
property 10 to 15 miles from area involved, court found no evidence of direct or indirect benefit,
ordinance stricken on other grounds).
79. Swift, 87 Wn. 2d at 361, 552 P.2d at 183.
80. Fleming, 81 Wn. 2d at 300, 502 P.2d at 331.
81. Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wn. 2d 416, 420-21, 526 P.2d 897,
900-01 (1974).
82. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wn.
2d 802, 806, 557 P.2d 307, 310 (1976) (this is the first nonland-use case to which the doctrine was
applied).
83. Save a Valuable Env't v. City of Bothell, 89 Wn. 2d 862, 872-73, 576 P.2d 401, 407 (1978).
84. 16 Wn. App. 668, 672-73, 558 P.2d 254, 257-58 (1977).
85. Id.
86. Vollrath v. Crowe, 9 Wash. 374, 376, 37 P. 474,475 (1894) (new trial ordered because plaintiff




judges, 87 later cases relied on the basic principle that justice requires an
appearance of fairness. 88 In 1898, the appearance of fairness standard was
87. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.12.040-.050 (1985), explained in Harris v. Hornbaker, 98 Wn. 2d
650, 666 n.3, 658 P.2d 1219, 1229 n.3 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring).
88. See, e.g., Dimmel v. Campbell, 68 Wn. 2d 697,414 P.2d 1022 (1966) (defendant's possession
of letter from judge's former law partner opining that case would result as was finally decided held
sufficient to disqualify judge for appearance of bias although judge did not remember ever seeing letter
and contents were never reviewed by trial court); State v. Romano, 34 Wn. App. 567, 569, 662 P.2d
406,407 (1983) (sentencing judge's contact with two personal friends to check veracity of defendant's
contention about financial matters violated Judicial Code of Conduct's ban on ex parte communication
about pending case; citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) ("justice must satisfy the appearance
of fairness.")); Henriksen v. Lyons, 33 Wn. App. 123,652 P.2d 18 (1982) (implied bias issue valid but
defendant waited too long to raise implied bias); State v. Hoff, 31 Wn. App. 809, 644 P.2d 763,
(plaintiff may contend that judge is biased because he represented defendant's wife in previous action,
but contention waived by failure to raise until after trial), cert. denied sub nom. Hoff v. Washington, 459
U.S. 1093 (1982); Rich v. Starczewski, 29 Wn. App. 244, 628 P.2d 831 (1981) (defendant may assert
judge denied motion for mistrial due to bias; however, court finds no evidence of bias and bias cannot be
presumed but must be affirmatively pleaded); Brister v. City of Tacoma, 27 Wn. App. 474, 619 P.2d
982 (1980) (appearance of fairness is violated by judge's taking adversarial role after learning developer
will rent houses to low income residents, but challenge raised too late); State v. Bolton, 23 Wn. App.
708, 598 P.2d 734 (1979) (appearance of fairness challenge recognized, but defendant charged with
negligent driving may not raise on appeal after defendant willingly accepted discretionary judgments
by judge whose son was killed by hit and run driver), rev. denied, 93 Wn. 2d 1014, 598 P.2d 734 (1980);
State v. Giebler, 22 Wn. App. 640,591 P.2d 465 (1979) (judge should not have had ex parte discussion
with sheriff about defendant's role in assault in jail while awaiting sentencing; however, defendant did
not object until appeal); State v. Price, 17 Wn. App. 247, 562 P.2d 256 (1977) (court examined the
fairness question, but found judge's refusal to admit defendant's polygraph test results at pretrial
hearing was not perceived unfairness in trial); State v. Grant, 10 Wn. App. 468, 519 P.2d 261 (1974)
(judge's refusal to admit new alibi evidence obtained after prosecution rested sufficient to affect
appearance of fair trial; new trial ordered); State v. Buntain, 11 Wn. App. 101, 521 P.2d 752 (1974)
(although appearance of fairness is legitimate question, presence of cattlemen at trial of alleged cattle
thief and newspaper articles did not prejudice judge and trial sufficiently to affect appearance of fair
trial, citing Smith, Fleming, and State v. Madry, 8 Wn. App. 61; 504 P.2d 1156 (1972) for appearance of
fairness doctrine); Madry, 8 Wn. App. 61,504 P.2d 1156 (judge's investigation of defendant's personal
life raised at presentencing hearing sufficient to violate appearance of fairness, required new trial). But
see State v. Smith, 93 Wn. 2d 329, 610 P.2d 869 (judge's concern that defendant had been dealing in
drugs did not make sentencing unfair; defendant did not raise affidavit of prejudice so waived right),
cert. denied sub nom. Smith v. Washington, 449 U.S. 873 (1980).
See also Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 87
Wn. 2d 802, 807,557 P.2d 307, 311 (1976), in which the court held that the same common law rules for
disqualification of judges apply to quasi-judicial decisionmakers.
But compare cases in which a test of reasonable doubt of bias instead of appearance of fairness was
used, e.g., State v. Franulovich, 89 Wn. 2d 521, 573 P.2d 1298 (1978) (judge disqualified because
reasonable doubt of fairness presented by proof that in previous prosecution he had said that he believed
fishing regulation at issue in present trial was invalid); Gardner v. Malone, 60 Wn. 2d 836, 376 P.2d
651,379 P.2d 918 (1962) (three jury members making private trip to scene of accident raises reasonable
doubt as to fairness of trial); Turngren v. King County, 33 Wn. App. 78, 649 P.2d 153 (1982) (judge
alleged to have said that he had great deal of respect for prosecutor who requested search warrant held
not sufficiently biased because no record of the statement existed; objecting counsel could have
provided record by requesting court reporter for hearing but did not); Williams & Mauseth Ins. Brokers
v. Chapple, 11 Wn. App. 623,524 P.2d 431 (1974) (judge who knew the only defense witness, said at
recess that he would have disqualified himself before trial if he 'had known that defense witness was
involved; possibility of bias not sufficient, absent showing of reasonable doubt); Brauhn v. Brauhn, 10
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first applied to a quasi-judicial proceeding. In that case, the court dis-
qualified a school board member from participating in the board's dis-
charge decision because he had brought the complaint against the superin-
tendent, whose job the board was considering, and announced that he
would vote to discharge him no matter what the evidence. 89
The appearance of fairness standard appears most frequently in the
context of land-use regulation. In Smith v. Skagit County,90 the Washington
court first established the requirement that land-use regulation hearings not
only be fair, but appear to be fair. In Smith, the board of county commis-
sioners had met with proponents of a rezone while refusing to meet with the
opponents. The court held that even though a rezone was a legislative action,
fundamental fairness demanded that the hearing appear to be fair in addition
to being fair.91 The Smith court focused on the fairness of the procedures.
The Washington court added the bias element to the standard in Fleming
v. City of Tacoma.92 There the court overruled a 1955 decision 93 which had
held that the motives of legislators could not be scrutinized, and reversed a
rezone decision because one of the city council members was employed by
the proponents of the rezone within days after the decision was rendered. 94
The court held that rezone decisions are quasi-judicial, not legislative, and
therefore subject to an appearance of fairness standard. 95 In Chrobuck v.
Snohomish County,96 the Washington court established a totality of the
circumstances test for the doctrine. The Chrobuck court held that the
cumulative affect of the behavior of the planning commissioners in a rezone
hearing lacked an "appearance of fairness": the commissioners had pub-
licly supported one of the parties, associated with the parties before the
proceeding, and denied all parties the right to cross-examine witnesses. 97
Wn. App. 592, 518 P.2d 1089 (1974) (judge's statement that fathers can better raise boys and mothers
raise girls not sufficient to show bias against mother seeking custody of youngest son; bias must be
against specific person); Spratt v. Davidson, I Wn. App. 523, 463 P.2d 179 (1969) (new trial order
reversed because trial court used possible influence test for appearance of fairness, not reasonable doubt
test, where jury member and defense attorney became sick, possibly making jury sympathetic to
defendant).
89. State ex rel. Barnard v. Board of Educ., 19 Wash. 8, 52 P. 317 (1898).
90. 75 Wn. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969).
91. Id. at 739-41, 453 P.2d at 846-47.
92. 81 Wn. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
93. Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wn. 2d 629, 289 P.2d 203 (1955).
94. 81 Wn. 2d at 300, 502 P.2d at 331.
95. Id. at 299, 502 P.2d at 331.
96. 78 Wn. 2d 858, 870, 480 P.2d 489, 496 (1971). The court acknowledged that, standing alone,
the circumstances would not constitute a breach of public trust, but the "combination of circumstances"
and the "cumulative impact ... cast an aura of improper influence, partiality and prejudgment over





The Washington courts have since applied the appearance of fairness
doctrine to adjudicatory proceedings in areas other than land-use regu-
lation.98 The Washington State Medical Disciplinary Board,99 Law
98. The court used the doctrine to review claims of appearance of bias in adjudicatory decisions.
Decisions reveal a variety of ways in which courts limit the doctrine. See In re Marriage of Wolfe, 99
Wn. 2d 531, 663 P.2d 469 (1983) (show cause procedure of court of appeals in which commissioner
presides is valid; allegation that decision made without reading record is speculative); Washington
Educ. Ass'n v. State, 97 Wn. 2d 899, 652 P.2d 1347 (1982) (board's dual role as policymaker and
adjudicator in terminating faculty member does not give rise to an appearance of fairness violation);
Ritter v. Board of Comm'rs, 96 Wn. 2d 503, 637 P.2d 940 (1981) (showing that one of hearing
committee witnesses participated on appellate review body in action to suspend hospital privileges is
not an affirmative showing of prejudgment bias); Standow v. City of Spokane, 88 Wn. 2d 624,564 P.2d
1145 (1977) (city council decision upholding police department denial of taxi operator's license involves
no possibility of gain or loss as result of decision); Amoss v. University of Wash., 40 Wn. App. 666,
700 P.2d 350 (1985) (two assistant attorneys general representing University in appeal of denial of
tenure did not confer and kept separate files); Butner v. City of Pasco, 39 Wn. App. 408, 693 P.2d 733
(1985) (no violation of apearance of fairness; commissioner testified at officer's discharge appeal,
abstained from voting, was cross-examined by officer); Skold v. Johnson, 29 Wn. App. 541, 557-58,
630 P.2d 456, 465-66 (1981) (no appearance of fairness violation because Human Rights Commission
has statutory mandate to apply state law against discrimination instead of state and federal constitu-
tions); In re Stockwell, 28 Wn. App. 295, 622 P.2d 910 (1981) (no violation of appearance of fairness
where member of chiropractic board that complained of misconduct voluntarily disqualified self from
hearing committee and abstained from board vote, defendant's license revoked for misconduct); Valley
View v. Department of Social and Health Servs., 24 Wn. App. 192, 599 P.2d 1313 (1979) (hearing
examiner as employee of agency that withdrew medicare patients from appellant medical facility not
partial, no proof of entangling influences); Booker v. South Cent. School Dist., 23 Wn. App. 274, 597
P.2d 395 (1979) (superintendent is both accusor and employee of board; no indication that board would
vote in appeal of teacher's hiring to please superintendent). See also infra notes 99-102. But see
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wn. 2d 802,
557 P.2d 307 (1976) (the only nonland-use case in which a violation was found; member of hearing
tribunal had employment application pending with party in dispute).
The court has also held some proceedings nonadjudicatory so the doctrine did not apply. See Side v.
Cheney, 37 Wn. App. 199, 679 P.2d 403 (1984) (mayor's decision to hire police chief is not quasi-
judicial decision); Somer v. Woodhouse, 28 Wn. App. 262, 623 P.2d 1164 (1981) (action to change rule
regarding supervision of opticians is rulemaking which is quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial). But see
Hasan v. Frederickson, 37 Wn. App. 800, 683 P.2d 203 (1984) (no appearance of fairness violation
because there was no indication university president's decision to ignore appeal committee recommen-
dation to grant professor pay increase was based on previous dispute with professor). In Hasan, the
court did not raise question whether proceeding was quasi-judicial, but should have since the decision
was not an adjudicatory issue and no hearing was conducted.
Statutes have been cited to restrict application of the doctrine. See Local Union 1296, International
Ass'n of Firefighters v. Kennewick, 86 Wn. 2d 156, 542 P.2d 1252 (1975) (standard of review of
arbitration by statute is "arbitrary and capricious"; fairness doctrine does not apply); Loveland v.
Leslie, 21 Wn. App. 84, 584 P.2d 664 (1979) (unknown to appellant, member of hearing tribunal was
member of commission; not violation of fairness doctrine because statute encourages commission
members to participate in hearings and provides safeguards by requiring that such participants not have
been involved with case or a part of investigation).
99. Washington Medical Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 29 Wn. App. 613, 630 P.2d 1354 (1981)
(agency's dual functions of investigation and prosecution is violation of doctrine), rev'd, 99 Wn. 2d
466, 663 P.2d 457 (1983).
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Enforcement Disability Board, I00 Department of Labor and Industries
Appeals Board, 10 1 and Clark County Committee on School District Organi-
zation, 10 2 among others, have been the subject of review under the doctrine.
C. Statutory Modification of the Doctrine
In 1978 the Washington Supreme Court, in dictum, stated that the
appearance of fairness doctrine is not constitutionally based. 103 The legis-
lature promptly limited the doctrine by statute.104 The appearance of
fairness statute does not attempt to define the doctrine, but limits the
doctrine's application and scope. 105 The statute attempts to limit applica-
tion of the doctrine in land-use regulation by identifying the local land-use
decisionmaking bodies to which the appearance of fairness doctrine may be
applied. 10 6 The statute prohibits application of the doctrine to local deci-
sionmakers conducting nonquasi-judicial business with constituents and to
the legislative actions of local legislative bodies. '0 7
The statute provides that candidates for public office may express opin-
ions and act upon those opinions in a quasi-judicial proceeding without
violating the doctrine. 108 It allows candidates to receive campaign contri-
butions from parties to a pending proceeding without violating the doc-
trine. 109 However, because campaign statements and contributions could
100. Keever v. Law Enforcement Officers' & Firefighters' Retirement Bd., 34 Wn. App. 873, 664
P.2d 1256 (1983) (board waiting until after condition improved to order physical exam and cancelling
appellant's membership in Law Enforcement Officers' and Firefighters' Retirement System held not a
violation).
101. Hill v. Department of Labor & Indus., 90 Wn. 2d 276, 580 P.2d 636 (1978) (appellant knew
chair of appeal board was supervisor of claims when disputed claim was closed but did not raise charge
of bias in proceeding; therefore waived right to application of doctrine on appeal).
102. Evergreen School Dist. v. Clark County Comm. on School Dist. Org., 27 Wn. App. 826, 621
P.2d 770 (1980) (decision to transfer property from one school to another is quasi-legislative decision,
not quasi-judicial; doctrine does not apply).
103. City of Bellevue v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wn. 2d 856. 863, 586 P.2d 470,
475 (1978) ("Our appearance of fairness doctrine, though related to concerns dealing with due process
considerations, is not constitutionally based. "). The court did not indicate why it made this declaration.
However, opponents of the doctrine took this opportunity to attempt to abolish the doctrine. Since it is
not constitutionally based, it is subject to revision through the legislative process. See R. SETTLE,
WASHINGTON LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE 203 (1983).
104. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.36.010-.900 (1985).
105. The official title of the statute is "The Appearance of Fairness Doctrine-Limitations." This
Comment will refer to it as "the appearance of fairness statute".
With the exception of Justice Dore's dissent in Zehring H, 103 Wn. 2d 588, 593, 694 P.2d 638, 640
(1985), the Washington courts have not acknowledged the existence of the statute. The reason for this is
not clear.
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.010 (1985).
107. Id. § 42.36.020-.030.
108. Id. § 42.36.040.
109. Id. § 42.36.050.
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bias a decisionmaker, the statute does not preclude a due process challenge
to a local land-use proceeding. 110
Under the statute a challenged decisionmaker may participate in a
proceeding when a disqualification of several decisionmakers would de-
stroy a quorum, making it impossible for the decisionmaking body to vote
or deliberate.' 11 The challenged decisionmaker must, in that case, disclose
the basis of the challenge.
The statute seeks to prevent a broader application of the doctrine. 112 It
prohibits parties from raising the doctrine as a basis for disqualifying a
decisionmaker if the challenge is not raised before a decision is ren-
dered. "13 The statute excepts a challenge from this timing requirement if
the challenger did not know the basis at that time. 114 It provides that the
doctrine can be restricted or eliminated by the appellate courts. 115
D. Judicial Criticism of the Appearance of Fairness Doctrine:
In recent years, the appearance of fairness doctrine has been severely
criticized by several members of the Washington Supreme Court." 6 In
Westside Hilltop Survival Committee v. King County"17 and Harris v.
Hornbaker, 118 the concurrence suggested abandoning the doctrine.
The Washington Supreme Court, as recently constituted, has not yet
addressed the appearance of fairness doctrine. 119 It is not clear whether the
110. Id. § 42.36.110.
111. Id. § 42.36.090. This policy of providing an exception when otherwise a decision could not
be rendered is known as the "doctrine of necessity."
112. Id. § 42.36.100. After identifying limits to application of the doctrine, the statute expressly
states that the statute shall not be construed to expand application of the doctrine. See infra note 120.
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.080 (1985).
114. Id. § 42.36.080.
115. Id. § 42.36.100. This is an unusual grant of power at first glance. Unlike most legislation
concerning judicially-created doctrines, however, the appearance of fairness statute does not codify the
doctrine. Therefore, this provision is just an acknowledgment that the legislature has left the doctrine's
ultimate fate to the courts.
116. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
117. 96 Wn. 2d 171, 181-82, 634 P.2d 862, 867-68 (1981) (Dolliver, J., concurring).
118. 98 Wn. 2d 659, 664-68, 658 P.2d 1219, 1228-30 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring).
119. Of the four "new" justices, Justices Durham and Goodloe were not members of the court until
after the Zehring I decision, the last opinion published on the appearance of fairness issue. Justices
Andersen and Callow were members of the Washington Supreme Court when Zehring II was heard, but
did not participate in that decision. Justice Callow, as an appeals courtjudge, wrote the opinion in Fleck
v. King County, 16 Wn. App. 668, 558 P.2d 254 (1977), which held that spouses voting on the same
board violated the doctrine. See Justice Utter's concurring opinion in Harris v. Hombaker, 98 Wn. 2d
650, 667, 658 P.2d 1219, 1229-30 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring), for criticism of the result reached in
Fleck. Only two of the justices who have criticized the doctrine, Justice Dollirer and Justice Utter,
remain on the court.
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court will continue to apply the doctrine, limit it further, replace it, or take
the legislature's invitation to eliminate it. 120
A possible alternative to the doctrine suggested in a concurring opinion
in Harris v. Hornbaker, 121 is the Washington State Code of Judicial
Conduct and procedural due process. The Code, many believe, offers an
actual bias standard instead of the appearance of bias standard of the
doctrine.122 It is also contended that since the appearance of a fair and
impartial hearing is a fundamental tenet of due process, the appearance of
fairness doctrine is merely a label for procedural due process. 123 Thus, the
title "appearance of fairness" might be abandoned in favor of a "fairness"
inquiry 24 that would include the actual bias standard of the Code and the
procedural standard of due process.
These alternatives to the appearance of fairness doctrine arise for several
reasons. First, there is a concern that quasi-judicial decisionmakers should
not be held to a stricter standard than judges. Under the doctrine, quasi-
judicial decisionmakers must meet an appearance of fairness standard,
whereas many believe judges are held only to an actual bias standard. 125
Those who would prefer the Code of Judicial Conduct over the appearance
of fairness doctrine point to decisions that resulted in "speculative and
conjectural" scrutiny of the actions of quasi-judicial decisionmakers.126
The suggestion has been made that with a "fairness" inquiry "jurispruden-
tially rooted," the quasi-judicial decisionmaker will not come under a
stricter standard than judges. 127 Second, because the doctrine has created
confusion for the courts and counsel, proponents of the due process
standard insist that courts and lawyers would have a larger, better known
body of case law for guidance. 128 This case law would eliminate the
confusion surrounding the doctrine, leaving decisionmakers more certain
of what behavior would be consistent with a fair proceeding.
120. WASH. REv. CODE § 42.36.100 (1985): "Nothing in this chapter prohibits the restriction or
elimination of the appearance of fairness doctrine by the appellate courts."
121. 98 Wn. 2d 650, 658 P.2d 1219 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring).
122. Id., 98 Wn. 2d at 665, 658 P.2d at 1228.
123. Washington Medical Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 99 Wn. 2d 466, 483-85, 663 P.2d 457.
466-67 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring).
124. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 667-68, 658 P.2d at 1228-30 (Utter, J., concurring).
125. See id.; Zehring 1, 99 Wn. 2d 488, 500, 663 P.2d 823, 830 (1983) (Utter, J., dissenting),
vacated, Zehring 11, 103 Wn. 2d 588, 694 P.2d 638 (1985).
126. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 667-68, 658 P.2d at 1228-30.
127. Id. at 668, 658 P.2d at 1230.
128. Zehring 1, 99 Wn. 2d at 500, 663 P.2d at 829-30 (Utter, J., dissenting).
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II. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
The Washington State Code of Judicial Conduct, promulgated by the
Washington Supreme Court, establishes the standard of behavior for judges
and others performing judicial functions. 129 The purpose of the Code is to
assure that hearings are conducted by impartial decisionmakers and to
maintain the integrity of the court. 130 -The Code promotes the independence
of the judiciary by requiring judges to avoid impropriety or the appearance
of impropriety and to perform the duties of the office impartially and with
diligence. 131 It also requires judges to regulate extra-judicial activities so
that the activities will not conflict with judicial duties. The Code allows
only limited participation by judges in political activities. 132
A. Replacing the Doctrine With Procedural Due Process Will Not
Eliminate an Appearance of Fairness Standard
Just as the substitution of the Code of Judicial Conduct would not
eliminate the need for appearance of fairness analysis, neither would the
reliance on due process jurisprudence. The appearance of fairness doctrine
analysis is due process analysis. 133 Common law due process requires that
no person having a conflict of interest may judge a case 134 because our
system of justice requires that no question or suspicion of the system and
the judge appear:135 " [J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice. "136
Constitutional due process requires an impartial decisionmaker.
137 This
requirement prohibits the "probability of unfairness." 138 Therefore, aban-
doning the "appearance of fairness" title and replacing it with a "fairness"
standard of due process would not substantially affect the outcome of cases
129. WASHINGTON STATE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT [hereinafter cited as JUDICIAL CODE],
Preamble (1986).
130. Id., Canon 1.
131. Id., Canons 1-3.
132. Id., Canons 5, 7.
133. See Washington Medical Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 99 Wn. 2d 466, 484, 663 P.2d 457,
467 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring) ("The requirement that a reasonably prudent and disinterested
observer should be able to conclude all parties obtained a fair, impartial and neutral hearing is a
fundamental tenet of due process.").
134. See Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 87
Wn. 2d 802, 807, 557 P.2d 307, 311 (1976).
135. Id. at 808, 557 P.2d at 312.
136. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
137. See Chicago, Milwaukee, 87 Wn. 2d at 807-09,557 P.2d at 311-12 (1976) (the common law
rules of disqualification for judges and quasi-judicial decisionmakers include the appearance of a fair,
unbiased decisionmaker).
138. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), cited by Justice Utter in Washington Medical
Disciplinary Bd., 99 Wn. 2d at 484, 663 P.2d at 467 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring).
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because constitutional due process and common law due process both
include an appearance of fairness element. 139 Under either label, the
specific doctrine for the context of quasi-judicial proceedings must be
developed.
As due process proponents suggest, due process analysis may provide
more settled and authoritative case law. Such case law, however, cannot
guide courts or decisionmakers in answering the threshold question of the
elements comprising a quasi-judicial proceeding. Decisionmakers must
still initially decide if they are in fact conducting a quasi-judicial proceed-
ing, because due process is not required in nonadjudicatory legislative
actions, which are the more frequent functions of many quasi-judicial
decisionmakers. 140 The appearance of fairness cases provide the substantial
body of case law distinguishing quasi-judicial and non-adjudicatory legis-
lative action. 141
B. Replacing the Doctrine With the Code of Judicial Conduct Will Not
Eliminate an Appearance of Fairness Standard
In Harris v. Hornbaker, 142 the concurrence asserted that Canon 3 of the
Washington State Code of Judicial Conduct should be applied to guide the
conduct of quasi-judicial decisionmakers because it would limit the scope
of the doctrine by imposing an actual bias standard. 143 Cases interpreting
139. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (procedural due process requires a fair
trial in a fair tribunal in administrative agencies and courts); State ex rel. Barnard v. Board of Educ., 19
Wash. 8, 17-19, 52 P. 317,320-21 (1898). This does not mean that due process considerations at issue in
appearance of fairness cases should not be fully articulated. The due process analysis should be
incorporated wherever it applies. Washington Medical Disciplinary Bd., 99 Wn. 2d at 484-85, 663
P.2d at 467 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring):
To label what are really due process concerns as the appearance of fairness doctrine is
unnecessarily confusing to lawyers who must attempt in some way to give meaning to an
unfathomable phrase. If we wish to maintain the continuing vitality of concerns over procedural
due process, its constitutional basis and scope must be acknowledged.
140. See Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 657, 658 P.2d at 1221.
141. See id.; Westside Hilltop Survival Comm. v. King County, 96 Wn. 2d 171, 634 P.2d 862
(1981); Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wn. 2d 847,557 P.2d 1306 (1976); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81
Wn. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
142. 98 Wn. 2d 650, 658 P.2d 1219 (1983).
143. Id. at 665, 658 P.2d at 1228 (Utter, J., concurring). See also id. at 668, 658 P.2d at 1230.
Justice Utter cites Fleck v. King County, 16 Wn. App. 668, 558 P.2d 254 (1977), as an example of a
"speculative and conjectural" fairness inquiry. In Fleck, the Washington Court of Appeals held that a
decision by a planning commission was invalid because the tie-breaking vote of the commission
chairman was the same as that of his wife who was voting on the commission. The court acknowledged
that it was expanding the doctrine to prohibit service of married people on the same quasi-judicial board
because it found this circumstance an "entangling influence," raising doubts as to whether both sides to
the argument received equal treatment. See Fleck, at 673, 558 P.2d at 257.
Had the Judicial Code been applied, however, the court would have had no better guidance because
no cases have been found in which a challenged judge has served on a panel with his or her spouse. Had
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Canon 3, however, have interpreted that section to impose an appearance of
fairness standard. 144 Therefore, even if the Code supplanted the appearance
of fairness doctrine as the bias standard for quasi-judicial decisionmakers,
appearance of fairness as well as actual bias would still be the standard.
The earliest Washington case in which the court held a quasi-judicial
decisionmaker to a standard of appearance of fairness was State ex rel.
Barnard v. Board of Education. 145 In that case the decisionmaker was not a
judge in a court of law, but a school board member who had announced that
he would vote to discharge the superintendent. The Washington court,
nevertheless, applied the judicial standard of conduct. 146 The Washington
Supreme Court has recognized the shared ancestry of the standard for
judges and the appearance of fairness doctrine by citing this case for the
proposition that the same standard of appearance of fairness applies to
judges and quasi-judicial decisionmakers. 147
An appearance of fairness standard has been used to disqualify judges
and to require new proceedings in several Washington court decisions.
Washington courts have disqualified judges for participation in ex parte
contacts, 148 for personal investigations outside the courtroom, 149 and for
knowledge of the case before the trial. 150 They have required new proceed-
ings because a trial lacked the appearance of fairness when ajudge rejected
alibi evidence offered after the prosecution had rested, although he could
have granted a continuance,151 and when ajudge had actively interceded in
the examination of witnesses. 152
Opponents of the appearance of fairness concept might argue the stan-
dard should be dropped in both the judicial and quasi-judicial setting in
favor of the actual bias standard. But the reason for going beyond proven
bias is to maintain public confidence by giving the benefit of the doubt to
such an occurrence come before the court, the Code might support the same result as the Fleck decision
because the court would still have to determine if, under the circumstances, the integrity of the court was
called into question. See JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 129, Canon 2(B) and Official Comment to 2(B).
144. See State v. Romano, 34 Wn. App. 567, 569,662 P.2d 406,407-08 (1983); State v. Madry, 8
Wn. App. 61,70,504 P.2d 1156, 1161(1972); see also Dimmel v. Campbell, 68 Wn. 2d 697,699,414
P.2d 1022, 1023 (1966); State v. Buntain, 11 Wn. App. 101, 107, 521 P.2d 752, 755-56 (1974).
145. 19 Wash. 8, 52 P. 317 (1898).
146. Id. at 17-19, 52 P. at 320-21.
147. See Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 87
Wn. 2d 802, 807-08, 557 P.2d 307, 311 (1976).
148. State v. Romano, 34 Wn. App. 567, 662 P.2d 406 (1983) (sentencing judge contacted two
personal friends to check veracity of defendant's testimony; court held that even where no actual bias,
appearance of fairness is required).
149. State v. Madry, 8 Wn. App. 61,504 P.2d 1156 (1972).
150. Dimmel v. Campbell, 68 Wn. 2d 697,414 P.2d 1022(1966).
151. State v. Grant, 10 Wn. App. 468, 519 P.2d 261 (1974).
152. Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, 93 Wn. 2d 127, 606 P.2d 1214 (1980) (judge actively
interceded by examining witnesses with disbelief; new trial granted).
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the potentially injured party, not the potentially biased one. 53 Both the
appearance of fairness doctrine and the impartiality standard of the Wash-
ington State Code of Judicial Conduct retain an appearance of fairness
element because both appear to have developed from the same common law
concept of due process.
Even though the Code and the appearance of fairness doctrine have an
appearance of fairness requirement, the appearance of fairness doctrine
seems to be a more burdensome standard. This is because of the conflict in
values that arises when a bias standard is applied to nonjudicial officials.
Elected and appointed officials must generally be accountable to their
constituents. Judges must generally be independent of outside influence.
The values of accountable public officials and independent decisionmakers
clash when an elected or appointed official is given quasi-judicial duties.
The accountable elected official has an affirmative duty to consider the
concerns of constituents. The official accounts for this duty by maintaining
open communication with the constituents. Yet, quasi-judicial decision-
makers must also consider every discussion with a constituent a possible ex
parte contact that could violate the appearance of fairness doctrine in an
adjudication. Judges, however, h ave no conflicting duty to maintain contact
with constituents. Thus, quasi-judicial decisionmakers find it much more
difficult to maintain the appearance of fairness while at the same time
seeking input on matters of public concern. Since judges need not, indeed
may not, actively solicit public input, they have no such thin line to walk.
C. Code of Judicial Conduct as a Standard for Quasi-Judicial
Decisionmakers
The Washington State Code of Judicial Conduct does not solve the
confusion surrounding the appearance of fairness doctrine since it carries
with it its own implied doctrine of appearance of fairness. 154 The substitu-
tion of the Code as the standard for quasi-judicial decisionmakers would
pose additional problems.
1. Code Does Not Distinguish Legislative From Quasi-Judicial
Functions
Because the courts may not apply a bias standard in reviewing legislative
decisions, 155 the distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial func-
tions is critical to determining when any bias standard may be applied to
153. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text.




quasi-judicial decisionmakers. The distinction between legislative and
quasi-judicial functions is not addressed by the Washington State Code of
Judicial Conduct. The Code does not speak to this issue because judges do
-not ordinarily have legislative duties. The only reference in the Code to
nonjudicial functions is the requirement that judges should never allow
outside activities to interfere with judicial duties nor appear to grant special
privileges to any party. 156
2. Application of the Washington State Code of Judicial Conduct
Sacrifices Accountability for Independence
If courts apply the bias standard in the Code to quasi-judicial decision-
makers, courts will impinge on the decisionmaker's accountability to the
electorate. The bias standard of the Code includes not only Canon 3, cited
by the concurrence in Harris v. Hornbaker, 157 but also Canons 2, 5, and
7.158 Canon 7 requires a restraint on political activity. It prohibits the
judicial candidate from making "pledges or promises of conduct in office"
as well as from discussing "his views on disputed legal or political
issues. " 159 It also prohibits personal solicitation of campaign contributions
by judicial candidates. 160
The Judicial Code's restraint on elected judges is proper since judges
face no conflict between the values of independence and accountability.
While judges in Washington are elected, they cannot be accountable to the
electorate in the same degree or in the same manner as quasi-judicial
decisionmakers. 161 The effective administration ofjustice demands that the
performance of a judge should not be representative of the concerns of the
electorate; rather, ajudge should make decisions based on the merits of the
case and the applicable rules of law. Thus, Canon 7 of the Washington State
Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits discussion of pending cases and judicial
opinions. 162 If a judicial candidate publicly expressed personal views on
issues in a current or impending proceeding, that expression would be
taken as a signal as to the way the judge would perform. The administration
156. See JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 129, Canon 3(A)(4).
157. 98 Wn. 2d 650, 658 P.2d 1219 (1983).
158. The bias standard of the Code includes: Canon 2-A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety And
The Appearance Of Impropriety In All His Activities; Canon 3-A Judge Should Perform The Duties
Of His Office Impartially And Diligently; Canon 5-A Judge Should Regulate His Extrajudicial
Activities To Minimize The Risk of Conflict With His Judicial Duties; Canon 7-A Judge Should
Refrain From Political Activity Inappropriate To His Judicial Office. JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 129.
159. Id., Canon 7(B)(1)(c).
160. Id., Canon 7(B)(2).
161. See Note, Ethical ConductIn A Judicial Campaign: Is Campaigning An EthicalActivity?, 57
WASH. L. Ray. 119, 136 (1981).
162. JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 129, Canon 7(B)(1)(c); see also id., Canon 3(A)(6).
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of justice requires public faith in the legal system. Impartiality of the
judiciary is an essential element in developing and maintaining that public
faith. 163 Campaign promises are not compatible with impartiality.
If Canon 7 were applied to quasi-judicial decisionmakers, however, the
accountability of these officials would be eroded. Elected officials are held
to a greater degree of public accountability than judges because the primary
function of these elected officials is to represent their constituencies. 164
Forbidding the quasi-judicial decisionmaker from having ex parte con-
tacts and from announcing a stand in advance of the decision may conflict
with the decisionmaker's role as a legislator.165 Quasi-judicial decision-
makers are elected primarily as legislators, not judicial decisionmakers. It
is the legislator's responsibility to listen to and represent constituents.
When an elected official is restrained from communicating with members
of the electorate, or from informing the electorate of a position on contro-
versial issues, the electoral process is impeded and the values of representa-
tive democracy are subverted. Prohibiting candidate discussion of contro-
versial issues in a political campaign and restricting discussion with
constituents and potential constituents, as the Code of Judicial Conduct
does, sacrifices accountability for independence.
While not a perfect standard, the appearance of fairness doctrine, as
modified by the statute, accommodates the conflict in values inherent in an
impartiality standard for elected officials. The appearance of fairness
statute accommodates the conflict between accountability and indepen-
dence by allowing candidates for public office to promise to vote a certain
way on pending quasi-judicial matters and to vote as promised without
163. See Note, supra note 161, at 136.
164. See Ellis, Judges and Politics: Accountability and Independence in an Election Year, 12
N.M.L. REV. 873, 881(1982) ("It is universally conceded that accountability to the voters is a desirable
goal in the executive and legislative branches of government.").
For further discussion of the conflict between the value of an accountable public official and the
provision in the Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibits the expression of opinion by judicial candidates
as political candidates, see Lovrich & Sheldon, Voters in Judicial Elections: An Attentive Public OrAn
Uninformed Electorate?, 9 JusT. Sys. J. 23 (1984); Ellis, supra.
165. Even the court has recognized that the legislator's role requires an expression of opinion on
issues. In Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wn. 2d 715, 740-41,453 P.2d 832, 847 (1969) the court stated:
Unlike ajudicial hearing where issues of fact should be resolved from the evidence only without
regard to the private views of the judges, a legislative hearing may reach a decision in part from the
legislator's personal predilections or preconceptions. Indeed, the election of legislators is often
based on their announced views and attitudes on public questions.
In Westside Hilltop Survival Comm. v. King County, 96 Wn. 2d 171, 179, 634 P.2d 862,866 (1981),
the court addressed the issue of ex parte contacts with legislators in their role as legislator:
As for ex parte contacts between the legislator and his constituents advocating specific legisla-
tion, it is an integral part of representative government at every level. It is a daily if not an hourly
occurrence across the land. Absent a charge of corruption, the court should not intrude upon the
legislative process. We leave to the political process the sanction, if any there be, for the conduct of




violating the appearance of fairness doctrine. 166 This accommodation,
however, seems to sanction decisions based on personal bias rather than
evidence, thereby raising an issue of denial of constitutional due process. 167
The statute addresses this possibility by providing that the statute does not
prohibit a due process challenge. 168 The Washington legislature has bal-
anced the right of free political speech and the value of accountable elected
official with the due process right to an impartial decisionmaker and may
have devised the only viable compromise. The Washington State Code of
Judicial Conduct would not provide such a balance. 1
69
3. Application of Canon 7(2) of the Washington State Code of Judicial
Conduct Could Foster New Uncertainty Regarding Campaigning
To ensure that judges will be free from outside influences and will
maintain the dignity of the office, the Washington State Code of Judicial
Conduct, Canon 7(2), prohibits the personal solicitation of campaign funds
by judges. 170 Application of this provision to quasi-judicial decisionmakers
who are elected officials would present administrative difficulties and
result in uncertainty.
Quasi-judicial decisionmakers are appointed and elected officials who
are not judges but make adjudicatory decisions as part of their duties of
office. 17 1 Not all elected officials, however, make decisions which are
adjudicatory in nature. Typically mayors of the larger jurisdictions, county
executives, county auditors, county prosecutors, and city attorneys have no
quasi-judicial duties. Application of the prohibition of personal campaign
solicitations only to those officials who are quasi-judicial decisionmakers
would present a substantial administrative burden. For example, in some
communities the mayor sits on the council and participates in quasi-judicial
decisions; candidates for mayor in those jurisdictions would not be allowed
to personally solicit campaign funds. In other jurisdictions, however, the
mayor never participates in such decisions; candidates for mayor in those
jurisdictions would not be subject to the ban.
Also, to be effective, application of Canon 7(2) to quasi-judicial deci-
sionmakers would require a before-the-election determination of which
166. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.040 (1985); see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
167. Procedural due process requires some kind of hearing before an impartial decisionmaker. See
generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
168. WASH. REv. CODE § 42.36.110 (1985); see infra note 169 and accompanying text.
169. The ban on discussion of issues and personal solicitation of campaign contributions in the
Code is absolute; there are no exceptions. See JuDIciAL CODE, supra note 129, Canons 3(A)(6),
7(B)(1)(c), 7(B)(2).
170. Id., Canon 7(B)(2).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
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positions were subject to the ban. Candidates would have to know in
advance if the ban on personal solicitation of campaign funds applied to
them so they could make a good faith effort to comply with the law. A
government entity would have to determine which candidates must abide
by the ban and which need not. Because of the number of potential
candidates involved, a difficult and costly process could result.
No Washington judicial decision tests whether an appearance of unfair-
ness is created when a party to a quasi-judicial proceeding has made a
campaign contribution to a decisionmaker. 172 The Washington legislature,
however, answered the question in the appearance of fairness statute. The
statute provides that campaign contributions to quasi-judicial decision-
makers do not create appearance of fairness doctrine violations. 173 If the
Washington State Code of Judicial Conduct were applied to quasi-judicial
decisionmakers instead of the appearance of fairness doctrine, the court
could develop a compromise for the Code's ban on personal solicitation of
campaign contributions. 174 Whatever the compromise, it would offer less
guidance than the appearance of fairness statute which precludes any
finding of a violation of the appearance of fairness doctrine due to the
receipt of campaign contributions. The Code or a compromise would also
provide less certainty than the doctrine and could be costly to administer.
4. Application of Canons 3(A)(4) and (6) Does Not Account for the
Unique Role of Staff in the Quasi-Judicial Proceeding
A glaring omission in the appearance of fairness doctrine is that it does
not deal with the problems that arise as a result of the unique role of staff in
quasi-judicial proceedings. If any part of the Code of Judicial Conduct
offered a solution, the courts should seriously consider incorporating it into
the doctrine. The Code, however, does not address the opportunity for ex
parte contacts of staff with decisionmakers and the parties to the proceed-
ing, and the potential for conflict of interest of participating staff.
172. The only discussion of campaign contributions in a Washington appearance of fairness case
was by the Washington Supreme Court in Westside Hilltop, 96 Wn. 2d 171, 634 P.2d 862 (1981). In an
action concerning an ordinance allowing construction of an office building, the court held that the
disputed action was an amendment to the comprehensive plan, therefore not subject to the doctrine
because amendments to comprehensive plans are legislative actions. Thus, the campaign contributions
were also not subject to an appearance of fairness review. The Westside court noted that the public
disclosure act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.010-.945 (1985), provides a reporting system that allows
the public to judge the public officeholder's impartiality. See 96 Wn. 2d at 179, 634 P.2d at 866.
173. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.050 (1985); see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
174. Possible compromises could include contribution limitations, or restrictions on time of
contribution in relation to the proceeding. The court could develop compromises, but the necessity of




Ex parte contacts are addressed in Canons 3(A)(4) and 3(A)(6) of the
Washington State Code of Judicial Conduct. 175 Those provisions prohibit
judges from engaging in ex parte contacts and communications about
pending proceedings. 176 Judges may seek the advice of disinterested ex-
perts, but only in the form of amicus briefs.177 The official comments to
Canon 3(A)(4) provide that the judge may consult with other judges or
court personnel in deciding cases. 178 Judges may not publicly comment on
proceedings pending in any court, however, and must require the same
behavior of their employees. 179
The role of staff in the quasi-judicial proceeding is very different from
that of judicial staff in a judicial proceeding. Judicial staff members do not
submit and comment on evidence during the judicial proceeding and are
not relied on as subject matter experts by the judge in making a decision.
Quasi-judicial decisionmakers, however, often must rely on the staff of
various departments for technical and support information. 180 Such infor-
mation is given both privately and in public hearings. Frequently, in quasi-
judicial proceedings, staff present evidence, comment on evidence pre-
sented, and make recommendations based on their expertise. Often staff
reports are the major source of evidence used against a party to the
proceeding. 181 The appearance of fairness statute prohibits ex parte con-
tacts between decisionmakers and parties during the pendency of a pro-
ceeding unless made on the record, 182 but it does not address ex parte
contacts with staff. The Washington State Code of Judicial Conduct does
not provide guidance for dealing with the unique role of staff in the quasi-
judicial proceeding. 183
175. JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 129, Canon 3(A)(4), 3(A)(6) ("Judge Should Perform the Duties
Of His Office Impartially and Diligently").
176. Id., Canon 3(A)(6).
177. Id., Canon 3(A)(4).
178. Id., Canon 3(A)(4) Comment.
179. Id., Canon 3(A)(6).
180. See Bowing v. Board of Trustees, 85 Wn. 2d 300, 312, 534 P.2d 1365, 1372 (1975), in which
the court noted that agency decisionmakers commonly rely on staff to read the record and issue reports
on which the decisionmakers rely as the basis of adjudicatory decisions. The members of the Board of
Trustees were not required to read the record of the review committee's hearings themselves in making a
decision to discharge a faculty member. See also Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wn. 2d 715,734,453 P.2d
832, 843 (1969), in which the court presumed the assistance of the staff in the planning commission's
deliberations and decision: "This announcement, we think, unmistakably conveyed the idea that the
commission was retiring to deliberate upon its decision, relying only upon its legally constituted staff to
aid it in formulating its judgment and to express it in words, graphs, charts and pictures."
181. See Chicago, Milwaukee, 87 Wn. 2d at 803,557 P.2d at 309 (1976); Chrobuckv. Snohomish
County, 78 Wn. 2d 858, 861, 480 P.2d 489, 492 (1971).
182. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060 (1985).
183. The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) may assist in dealing with the staff's role because it
does provide distinctions among staff members. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1982). The APA has been
interpreted to divide staff into three classifications: decisionmaking staff, investigative staff, and other
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Another problem that is inherent in the unique role of staff in the quasi-
judicial proceeding is the potential for staff conflict of interest. Staff may
personally benefit directly or indirectly from a decision. Staff members
who participate in the proceeding, or whose investigations are used in the
proceeding, often have greater influence with the decisionmaker than the
parties to the conflict because of their recognized expertise. Yet, staff
members are not forbidden from participating in the hearings or required to
disclose their interests when a potential conflict of interest arises.
Neither the appearance of fairness statute nor the courts have dealt with
the potential conflict of interest of staff participating in a quasi-judicial
proceeding 184 or the effect of staff's personal bias on the decision. This
omission would not be corrected by substituting the Washington State
Code of Judicial Conduct for the appearance of fairness doctrine. The Code
does not address the personal biases of staff or account for the unique role
of staff as experts in the quasi-judicial proceeding.
III. MODIFYING THE DOCTRINE
The appearance of fairness doctrine creates confusion and frustration
among decisionmakers and courts because the proceeding to which it is
members. See Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal Administrative
Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 759 (1981), reprinted in ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U. S. RECOMMENDATIONS
AND REP. 141, 147 (1981). Decisionmaking staff include administrative law judges and intermediate
review boards and their staffs. Under the APA, decisionmakers can be advised off-the-record by other
decisionmakers and their personal staffs, and by everyone else who has had no dealings with the
pending issue. Id. at 147. Investigative staff who have worked or will be working on the pending issue,
on the other hand, may not give off-the-record advice to decisionmakers. They may only advise on-the-
record as witnesses or counsel for the agency. Id. This model could be effectively applied to staff under
the appearance of fairness doctrine which deals with the problem in only a limited way.
Under the appearance of fairness doctrine, staff who investigate prior to a proceeding or participate in
a proceeding would not be allowed to have off-the-record discussions with the decisionmaker, but the
decisionmaker's personal staff or other staff who do not have a role in the pending proceeding would be
allowed to have off-the-record discussions of the pending issues with the decisionmaker. See infra Part
III.B.2.a.
Staffcan include anyone from secretary to technician. Anyone who works for the agency is subject to
the rules and procedures of the agency.
184. The City of Seattle has provided for this possibility with an ordinance:
No current city officer or employee shall: have a financial or other private interest, direct or
indirect, personally or through a member of his or her immediate family, in any matter upon which
the officer or employee is required to act in the discharge of his or her official duties, and fail to
disqualify himself or herself from acting or participating.
See SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE § 4.16.070 (A)(1)(b) (1985).
Seattle is the largest city in Washington State and one of only ten Washington cities operating under a
home rule charter. Most of the other 256 cities and towns in Washington have populations of 5000 or
less. They are unlikely to have formal procedures that include ethics codes. Telephone interview with
Patrick Mason, Legal Consultant of the Municipal Research and Services Center, Seattle, Washington
(January 8, 1986) (notes of interview on file with the Washington Law Review).
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applied is not clearly defined and the elements of a violation are not
comprehensively stated. Also, the doctrine is not as effective as it could be
because it does not address ex parte contacts with staff and the potential for
staff bias. Rather than abandon the appearance of fairness doctrine, the
Washington courts or legislature should further modify it to correct its
deficiencies, and clearly define its elements and the prerequisites for
violation.
A clear definition of the threshold distinction between legislative, ad-
ministrative, and quasi-judicial proceedings is needed to provide certainty
for the courts and the decisionmakers. Several Washington cases contain
discussion of the distinction, but none has a comprehensive definition of a
quasi-judicial proceeding. 185
An airtight definition cannot be devised, of course, because any defini-
tion of the appearance of fairness doctrine must be flexible, allowing for the
"totality of the circumstances." It is impossible to define every circum-
stance in which a violation of the doctrine will be found. However, a
workable definition of the violation of an appearance of fairness must
include the most common circumstances to which the doctrine would be
applied. A workable definition must provide a standard broad enough to
penalize the most egregious violators and yet narrow enough to provide an
incentive for quasi-judicial decisionmakers to disqualify themselves, since
the courts have an opportunity to review only a minimal number of cases. 186
A. A Suggested Definition of a Quasi-Judicial Proceeding:
Quasi-judicial proceedings involve: (1) issues in which the parties are a
relatively small group of people, exceptionally affected, each on individual
grounds; (2) a decisionmaker who applies general principles to the facts
presented to affect each of the parties individually; (3) a de cisionmaker
who has broad discretion; and (4) a hearing.
The proposed definition provides that whenever a hearing is conducted
and all of the other requirements of an adjudication are met, the doctrine
185. See Harris v. Hornbaker, 98 Wn. 2d 650,657,658 P.2d 1219, 1222 (1983); Westside Hilltop
Survival Comm. v. King County, 96 Wn. 2d 171,176-78,634 P.2d 862,865 (1981); Leonard v. City of
Bothell, 87 Wn. 2d 847, 850-51,557 P.2d 1306, 1308-09 (1976); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wn.
2d 292, 299, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972).
186. See Westside Hilltop, 96 Wn. 2d at 181, 634 P.2d at 867 (1981) (Rosellini, J., concurring):
The number of cases which the courts review regarding quasi-judicial action is miniscule when
compared to the number of cases on which quasi-judicial boards function. The action of a quasi-
judicial board may change a marginal plan developer into a millionaire. In the public utility field, a
board may grant a rate increase as high as $60 million per year. The appearance of fairness doctrine
is designed to assure unbiased review. Hopefully, it prevents excessive fraternization, conflict of
interest, prejudgment and improper ex parte contacts; and what is commonly known in street
parlance as "pal deals."
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applies. It does not give weight to the technicality of whether the hearing
was statutorily required. It includes both elements of an adjudication
included in the Londoner/Bi-Metallic analysis of identifiable parties, ex-
ceptionally affected and a decision based on facts specific to those parties.
It includes reference to the basis of the decision, an element of an adjudica-
tion not clearly expressed in the Washington cases. The definition requires
a review of the amount of discretion of the decisionmaker in all cases, not
just those in which the decisionmaker is an employee of the executive
branch of government. This definition provides better guidance for the
courts and quasi-judicial decisionmakers by identifying the characteristics
of an adjudicatory issue and the circumstances in which the resolution of
such issues are adjudicatory proceedings to which the appearance of
fairness doctrine applies.
B. A Suggested Definition of an Appearance of Fairness Violation
Neither the statute nor the cases sufficiently define an appearance of
fairness violation; 187 decisionmakers do not know what combination of
circumstances would taint the appearance of fairness. The statute contains
no definition or "test" for the appearance of fairness. The judicial "test" for
appearance of fairness is whether a reasonably prudent and disinterested
observer would conclude that all parties obtained a fair, impartial, and
neutral hearing. 188 This test requires that quasi-judicial decisionmakers
plan their actions without the benefit of a particularized list of procedures
and behavior that demonstrates bias.
The Judicial Code and the cases that interpret it give no clearer guide-
lines for an appearance of unfairness than the statute and the appearance of
fairness doctrine cases. The Code does not attempt to define an appearance
of fairness or an appearance of fairness violation; rather it uses an equally
ambiguous phrase, "Appearance of Impropriety." 189 It also requires dis-
qualification of a judge if the judge's "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. " 190 The Code's standard is a reasonable person test like that of
the appearance of fairness doctrine.
Washington case law has developed a rough definition of the appearance
of fairness violation. This should be codified to provide guidance for the
quasi-judicial decisionmaker and the court in applying the doctrine.
187. As Justice Utter noted in Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 668, 658 P.2d at 1229 (Utter, J., concurring),
the board members could not have predicted in advance the result in Fleck v. King County, 16 Wn. App.
668, 558 P.2d 254 (1977).
188. See Swift v. Island County, 87 Wn. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 183 (1976).
189. JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 129, Canon 2.
190. Id., Canon 3(C)(1).
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1. Suggested Guidelines for Regulating the Decisionmaker
a. Procedural:
An appearance of fairness violation will require a new proceeding when
any one or more of the following occurs: (1) notice was not adequate; (2)
the opportunity to be heard was not given to all parties to the proceeding;
(3) cross-examination of all parties to the proceeding represented by
counsel was not allowed to all parties who requested the right; (4) a
verbatim record was not kept.
b. Bias of the Decisionmaker:
A new proceeding will be held without the challenged decisionmaker
when a reasonable, disinterested observer would conclude that one or more
of the parties did not receive a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing because
the challenged decisionmaker: (1) had a direct or indirect 91 financial or
personal interest in the outcome of the decision, unless that interest can be
shown to be de minimus; or (2) had some association with one of the parties
to the proceeding that would influence his decision, unless it can be shown
that the association did not influence the decision; or (3) had an employer
with a direct financial or personal interest in the outcome of the decision,
unless it can be shown that that interest was de minimus; or (4) was
employed by one of the parties within one year after the decision or had an
opportunity to be employed by one of the parties as a result of the outcome
of the decision; or (5) expressed a predecision opinion, outside of a political
campaign, as to the subsequent outcome of the proceeding; or (6) had ex
parte contacts, during pendency of the proceeding, with parties to the
proceeding or with staff who participated in the proceeding and did not
enter those contacts in the record of the proceeding.
The question of whether there has been a violation of the appearance of
fairness doctrine must be decided on the basis of each and every specific
fact relevant to the adjudication in question. All circumstances must be
considered. Any single element from the lists above, however, would be
191. The court found indirect benefit to the decisionmaker sufficient to taint the proceedings in
Swift, 87 Wn. 2d at 361,552 P.2d at 183 (chairman of board of county commissioners was stockholder
and chairman of the board of the bank that held mortgage interest in land involved), and Buell v. City of
Bremerton, 80 Wn. 2d 518, 525, 495 P.2d 1358, 1362-63 (1972) (chairman of planning commission
owned property two lots removed from the land to be rezoned). But see West Slope Community Council
v. City of Tacoma, 18 Wn. App. 328, 336, 569 P.2d 1183, 1188 (1977) (councilman's cabinet company
often bid for subcontract work with proponent; interest held too remote and tenuous to taint proceed-
ing), rev. denied, 89 Wn. 2d 1016 (1978); Byers v. Board of Clallam County Comm'rs, 84 Wn. 2d 796,
802-03,529 P.2d 823,828-29 (1974) (members of planning commission owned property 10 to 15 miles
from area to be zoned and no indication property would be benefited).
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grounds for eliminating a decisionmaker or requiring a new proceeding, if
the violation is so egregious that a reasonable, disinterested observer would
conclude that one or more of the parties did not receive a fair, impartial, and
neutral hearing.
Two of the circumstances enumerated above are not currently found in
the Washington cases: association of the decisionmaker with one of the
parties to the proceeding, and ex parte contacts with staff.
The proposed definition of a violation of appearance of fairness includes
a prohibition of the decisionmaker's association with the parties to the
proceeding, but does not prohibit association with members of the tribunal.
An association with one of the parties could be sufficient to disqualify a
decisionmaker because a reasonable observer could conclude that the
association influenced the decision. However, under 'this proposal the
presumption that an association between a decisionmaker and a party to a
proceeding is a violation may be rebutted. The presumption is rebuttable
because associations are not always influential and are often impossible to
avoid in small or close communities.
The proposal does not include a presumption that an appearance of
fairness is violated when the association is between members of a tribunal,
unlike the potential scope of the decision in Fleck v. King County, 192 in
which the court held that the votes of spouses on the same board appeared
to be biased because their association provided an "entangling influ-
ence." 193 To presume that mere association among decisionmakers results
in a lack of independent judgment could severely impede the functioning of
many councils, boards, and commissions that make critical decisons in
local government. Members of the tribunal who conduct the business of the
tribunal often must associate to perform their duties. Therefore, the pro-
posed association provision presumes that decisionmakers will not be
influenced by the mere association with other decisionmakers. Unlike the
rest of the doctrine, it gives the benefit of the doubt to the decisionmaker,
not to the potentially injured party. The provision, however, includes a
proviso that allows for the exceptional case where the presumption is
rebutted by a specific showing of undue influence through association.
192. 16 Wn. App. 668, 558 P.2d 254 (1977).
193. Id. at 672, 558 P.2d 257. The court did not discuss what other relationships might be deemed
excessively "entangling." Subsequent developments in the women's movement toward recognition of




2. Suggested Guidelines for Regulating the Staff
a. Ex parte Communiciations With Staff:
A new proceeding will be required when a reasonable, disinterested
observer would conclude that one or more of the parties to a proceeding did
not receive a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing because the following
contacts during the pendency of the proceeding were not placed in the
record: (1) contacts between parties to the hearing and a staff member who
is investigating an issue concerning those parties, or who is a participant in
the proceeding to which they are parties; or (2) contacts between a deci-
sionmaker and a staff member who is investigating an issue that is pending
before that decisionmaker or who is participating in the proceeding before
that decisionmaker. Contacts with decisionmakers or staff who are not
investigating the pending issue nor participating in the pending proceeding
need not be placed in the record. The decisionmaker's own personal staff is
exempt from the ex parte recording requirement unless that person has a
role in the proceeding.
This standard is an expansion of the rule that requires all ex parte
contacts between quasi-judicial decisionmakers and parties to the proceed-
ing be placed in the record. It includes contacts between participating/
investigating staff and the interested parties and participating/investigating
staff and the decisionmaker. This standard gives the parties to the proceed-
ing an opportunity to respond to staff comment and information, like any
other supportive or adverse testimony that might influence the decision.
b. Bias of Staff.
A new proceeding will be required when a reasonable, disinterested
observer would conclude that one of the parties to the proceeding did not
receive a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing because a staff member who
participated in the proceeding through written or oral report, or by con-
ducting some aspect of the proceeding, or who did investigatory work prior
to the proceeding: (1) had a direct of indirect financial or personal interest in
the outcome of the decision, unless that interest can be shown to be de
minimus; (2) had some association with one of the parties to the proceeding
that would influence his or her work, unless it can be shown that the
association would not influence his or her work; (3) had an opportunity to
be employed by one of the parties to the proceeding as a result of the
outcome of the staff person's recommendation or the decision; or (4) was
employed by one of the parties to the proceeding within one year of the
decision, unless it can be shown the employment was not the result of the
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staff person's recommendation in the proceeding. If the staff member does
not voluntarily disqualify himself or herself, any party to the proceeding
can challenge the participation of the staff member with the same effect as
if challenging a decisionmaker. Disqualification of a staff member also
means that staff member's written or oral report may not be used in the
quasi-judicial process.
The potential conflict of interest of staff and the influence that staff has
on quasi-judicial decisionmaking is a sufficient threat to the fairness of the
proceeding to justify applying the bias standard that is applied to decision-
makers to staff who participate in the proceeding. Any staff person who
participates in a quasi-judicial proceeding as an expert witness, personally
or through a report, or by presenting or commenting on evidence should be
disqualified from any participation in the proceeding if that person may
benefit, directly or indirectly, from the decision, unless the benefit can be
shown to be de minimus. 194 The one exception to the standard imposed on
decisionmakers is that a decision should not be subject to reversal on
appearance of fairness grounds because a staff member accepted employ-
ment with a party to the proceeding within one year of the decision. This
concession represents a balancing between the need for the appearance of
fairness and the tendency of staff members to accept employment in areas
of their expertise. A strict requirement would be too restrictive because
hiring a staff person is not direct assurance of a favorable decision. Staff
members may only influence a decisionmaker; they cannot vote.
c. Coping With Compliance With the Doctrine
The bias standard and ex parte contacts requirement for staff are appro-
priate additions to the doctrine because they provide a safeguard on the
influential role of staff in a quasi-judicial proceeding. The standards will
add to the credibility of the process since often the parties involved in a
quasi-judicial proceeding might feel helpless in dealing with biased mem-
bers of the staff. Some measure of accountability occurs at the ballot box to
eliminate biased quasi-judicial decisionmakers who are elected officials, or
to eliminate them indirectly by voting against an appointing official of the
biased decisionmaker. Staff, however, are not answerable to the parties and
often, because of civil service or other employment arrangements, they are
not even accountable to the decisionmakers. The staff bias standard and ex
parte contacts requirement would provide a better opportunity for a fair and
impartial hearing.
These proposed guidelines will eventually result in the necessity of
filling the gap left by the disqualified staff member. No jurisdictional
194. For definition of staff, see supra note 183.
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problem would arise in replacing a staff person who has been disqualified,
since staff are not limited to one jurisdiction, as elected and appointed
officials are. In small jurisdictions, however, disqualification of a staff
.person could present an economic problem, since frequently only one
person on staff has the requisite expertise to advise the decisionmakers.
Those jurisdictions often have contracts with other jurisdictions for the
exchange or use of personnel in times of need.195 Formal and informal
agreements could be used to alleviate the problem by providing the needed
expertise and perhaps even reducing the cost by paying with services in-
kind. While replacing disqualified staff members will be an added cost of
the proceeding, procedural safeguards which assure an impartial decision-
maker are usually more expensive than less structured public hearings.
Fairness demands those safeguards.
IV. CONCLUSION
In contrast to the nearly 2,000-year development of the common law due
process principles on which it is based, Washington's appearance of fair-
ness doctrine has been developing for less than two decades. The uncer-
tainty and lack of guidance that attend the development of new law cause
frustration and conflict for those to whom the law applies and those who
must apply it. However, to abandon the doctrine for the Washington State
Code of Judicial Conduct would lead to equal or greater frustration. The
Code does not address the conflict of values that inevitably flows from
application of an impartiality standard to political decisionmakers. Indeed,
the Code sacrifices the value of accountable political decisionmaker for that
of independent decisionmaker; it does not balance those values.
Nor is procedural due process analysis a viable substitute because it, too,
includes an appearance of fairness element. Due process analysis does not
define an appearance of unfairness any more clearly than does the appear-
ance of fairness doctrine and does not answer the threshold question of
what constitutes a quasi-judicial proceeding. Therefore, it would not ad-
vance jurisprudence to abandon the appearance of fairness doctrine in favor
of due process analysis, nor provide more certainty.
195. A mechanism exists for cities and towns to provide for the replacement of a biased staff person
with a staff person from another jurisdiction. Washington law authorizes cities, towns, and special
districts to enter agreements with other government entities to share the cost and usage of, or pay a
reasonable fee for, services or equipment. WASH. REv. CoDE §§ 39.34.010-.920 (1985). Smaller towns
and cities frequently use these agreements, known as interlocal agreements, to expand their services
more economically. Thus, several cities in a county could contract for the services of staff that might be
involved in quasi-judicial proceedings, at a reasonable fee, if a staff person should be disqualified.
Telephone interviews with City Clerks of Edmonds, Lake Forest Park, and Lynnwood, Washington
(January 8, 1986) (notes of interviews on file with the Washington Law Review).
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The Washington legislature has attempted to ameliorate the conflict in
values that results from application of a bias standard to elected officials by
statutorily modifying the doctrine. That task is incomplete. The legislature
or the court could provide a clearer definition of quasi-judicial proceedings
(the threshold determination for application of the doctrine), an enumera-
tion of the circumstances in which the appearance of unfairness would be
most likely to occur, and a recognition of the role of staff members in the
process and accommodation for the possibility that their biases may make a
decision appear unfair.
The appearance of fairness doctrine creates difficulties for quasi-judicial
decisionmakers because of their dual role as legislators and adjudicators.
Abandoning the doctrine will only result in a need to develop another
because of the inadequacy of existing analogous jurispridence. 196 Perfect-
ing the doctrine is a far better alternative.
Carolyn M. Van Noy
196. In a recent decision the King County Superior Court held that a Bellevue City Council
member's attendance at a building project opponent's fundraising meeting prior to a vote that denied
approval of the project was a violation of the doctrine. West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, No.
85-2-13557-1 (King County Super. Ct. Wash. April 21, 1986).
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